Strategic Information Exchange by Rosenberg, Dinah et al.
Strategic Information Exchange
Dinah Rosenberg∗, Eilon Solan† and Nicolas Vieille‡
November 18, 2018
Abstract
We study a class of two-player repeated games with incomplete information
and informational externalities. In these games, two states are chosen at the
outset, and players get private information on the pair, before engaging in
repeated play. The payoff of each player only depends on his ‘own’ state and
on his own action. We study to what extent, and how, information can be
exchanged in equilibrium. We prove that provided the private information of
each player is valuable for the other player, the set of sequential equilibrium
payoffs converges to the set of feasible and individually rational payoffs as
players become patient.
Whether and how to acquire information is a question faced by most decision
makers. In statistical decision problems, the decision maker tries to learn the value
of an unknown parameter, and he can sample from an exogenous population at a
fixed cost per draw. In other contexts, information is held by strategic agents. In
signalling games for instance, a player holding payoff-relevant private information
tries to influence the action choice of an uninformed party. There, the rationale
for disclosing/hiding information is that the uninformed party’s action affects the
payoff of the informed player. We here study a class of repeated games with private
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information, in which there is no such direct strategic interaction: as in setups of
social learning, or of strategic experimentation, payoffs do not depend upon other
players’ actions. However, players hold private information that has value to other
players. Our goal is to understand to what extent information can be exchanged at
equilibrium along the play, assuming communication is costly. This assumption of
pure informational externalities plays a dual role. Obviously, it simplifies the analysis
of the model and allows to study the exchange of information in isolation from other
strategic considerations. But it leads to a game in which we might least expect
exchange of information, and any positive result in this setup might potentially open
the way for the analysis of other setups.
As an illustration, consider the following game. There are two biased coins, C1
and C2 (say, with parameter
2
3
), which are tossed independently once at the outset
of the game. Each of two players, i = 1, 2, has to repeatedly guess the outcome of
coin Ci. A correct guess yields a payoff of one, while an incorrect one yields zero, and
successive payoffs are discounted. If past payoffs are not observed, there is no role
for direct inference, and it is natural to expect that player i will repeatedly ‘guess’
the most likely outcome, for an expected payoff of 2
3
. Assume that, once coins are
drawn, each player i gets to observe the outcome of coin Cj, where j 6= i, but that
cheap talk is excluded. This private information has no ‘direct’ value, but it might
have a strategic value, because it is valuable to the other player. In this game, is
there an equilibrium payoff that improves upon (2
3
, 2
3
) ? While stylized, this game is
similar to the situation faced by executives of two different firms, who hold private
information on their own firm. Trading the stock of one’s own firm is illegal, at times
where private information is most valuable, and the executives may be tempted to
implement some implicit collusive scheme of information exchange through time.
We start with few simple observations. Since cheap talk is assumed away, ex-
change of information is to take place through actions, by ‘encoding’ privately held
information into actions, and by conditioning the action choice of player i on the
outcome of coin Cj. Plainly, there is no equilibrium in which each player i fully ‘dis-
closes’ the outcome of Cj at stage 1. Indeed, once informed of the outcome of C2,
player 2 can make the correct guess in all subsequent periods, and has no incentive
whatsoever to incur the cost of disclosing information to player 1, including in stage
1. But then, player 1 would not be willing to play the myopically suboptimal action
in stage 1. More generally, private information is here an asset to be exchanged for
2
private information, at a cost. On the one hand, a player cannot disclose informa-
tion without assigning positive probability to his myopically suboptimal action, and
thereby incurring a cost.1 On the other hand, a player is not willing to play a myopi-
cally suboptimal action, unless he expects to be rewarded with valuable information
in return: no player wants to be the last one to disclose information. Not surpris-
ingly, when the horizon is finite we prove that (2
3
, 2
3
) is the unique equilibrium payoff.
Having an infinite horizon raises the possibility of a gradual, open-ended exchange
of information. Since however, the total ‘amount’ of information to be exchanged is
bounded, the feasibility of such a process is not ensured.
Our model is a generalization of the stylized example. Two ‘states’, s and t, are
drawn independently, and players get private information on both s and t.2 Next,
the players repeatedly choose actions, which are publicly disclosed. The crucial as-
sumption we make is that a player’s payoff only depends on ‘his’ state, and on his
own action.
We prove that, provided that the information held by each player is valuable to
the other player, the limit set (as δ → 1) of sequential equilibrium payoffs coincides
with the set of all feasible payoffs, that are at least equal to the initial, myopic optimal
payoffs. In the simple example discussed above, this limit set is thus equal to the
set [2
3
, 1] × [2
3
, 1]. Not only information can be shared, but the rate of information
exchange can be arbitrarily high relative to the discount rate. Our equilibria share the
following features. Players start by reporting truthfully whatever information they
received on their own state. This leads to a continuation game in which no player
holds private information on his own state. As a result, each player is able to compute
how costly it is for the other player to play his suboptimal action, and is therefore able
to adjust accordingly the amount of information he discloses as a ‘reward’. Players
next exchange information in an open-ended manner. The analysis presents two
main and mostly independent difficulties. One is to design open-ended equilibrium
processes, according to which information is exchanged. In our construction, the bulk
of information exchange takes place early in the game. Later information disclosure
only serves as a means to compensate for previously incurred costs. The second
consists in adjusting this continuation play so as to provide the incentives for truthful
reporting of one’s information on one’s own state.
1Unless if indifferent, but this possibility will play no role.
2That is, each player receives information both on his state and on the other player’s state.
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Our motivation stems from repeated games with incomplete information. The
literature on such games started with Aumann and Maschler (1966, 1995), and was
extensively developed under the assumption of no discounting, see chapters 5 and 6
in Aumann and Hart (1992). When there is no discounting, communication through
actions becomes costless, and our model, trivial. Besides the literature on reputation
models, see Mailath and Samuelson (2006) for a survey, there is only limited work
dealing with discounted repeated games with incomplete information. Recent con-
tributions are Cripps and Thomas (2003), Peski (2008) and Wiseman (2005).3 Both
Cripps and Thomas (2003), and Peski (2008) look at games with one-sided informa-
tion, in which each of the two players knows his own payoff function, and one of the
two is unsure of the payoff function of the other player. Cripps and Thomas (2003)
prove that a Folk Theorem type of result holds in the limit where the prior belief
converges to the case of complete information. Peski (2008) essentially shows that
all equilibria are payoff-equivalent to equilibria that involve finitely many rounds of
information revelation. Wiseman (2005) looks at situations of common uncertainty.
Players share the same information on the underlying state of nature, and refine this
information by observing actual choices and payoffs.
Starting with Crawford and Sobel (1982), the huge literature on strategic infor-
mation transmission and on cheap-talk games addresses issues related to ours. The
paper that is closest to our work is Aumann and Hart (2003). There, prior to playing
a game once, two players, one of which is informed of the true game to be played,
exchange messages during countably many periods. Aumann and Hart (2003) char-
acterize the set of equilibrium payoffs. Following an example of Forges (1990), they
show that allowing for an unbounded communication length may increase the set of
equilibrium payoffs. There are however significant differences with our setup. On
the one hand, this literature allows the game to exhibit informational and strategic
interaction as well. On the other hand, information is one-sided, and communication
is costless.
Finally, the pattern of information disclosure in our setup is reminiscent of the
pattern of contributions in dynamic models of public good contributions, see Admati
and Perry (1991), Marx and Matthews (2000), or in the dynamic resolution of the
hold-up problem, see Che and Sakovics (2004). More generally, and as Compte and
Jehiel (2004) argue, the existence of a history-dependent outside option forces equi-
3An older one is Mayberry (1967).
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librium concessions to be gradual in many bargaining situations, just as information
disclosure has to be gradual and open-ended here. There are however differences
between the results on the two models. First, in dynamic models of public good con-
tributions the evolution of contributions follows a deterministic trend, while in games
with incomplete information beliefs follow a martingale. A more significant differ-
ence is the following. In the former models, there is a one-to-one relation between
the contributed amount and the cost incurred when contributing: the more a player
contributes, the higher his cost by doing so. Here, the cost of disclosing information
is independent of the amount of information that is disclosed. The reason is that the
cost of disclosure is incurred when playing a (myopically) suboptimal action, while
the amount of information is a function of how revealing such an action is. The more
precise the belief, the higher the cost of disclosing information.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 1 contains the model and a statement
of our main results. Section 2 presents the main ideas of the proof through a version
of the example discussed above (allowing for private signals). Section 3 is devoted to
concluding comments. Proofs are provided in the Appendix.
1 Model and Main Result
1.1 The Game
We study a class of two-player repeated games with incomplete information. At the
outset of the game, a state of the world is realized, and the two players receive private
signals, l ∈ L and m ∈ M respectively. At each stage n ≥ 1, players choose actions
from the action sets A and B. Actions, and only actions, are then publicly disclosed.
All sets are finite. Players share a common discount factor δ < 1.
We make the following assumption:
A.1 The set of states of the world is a product set, S × T , with elements denoted
by (s, t). Player i’s payoff depends only on his own action and on the i-th
component of the state. That is, the payoff function of player 1 is a function
u : S × A→ R, while player 2’s payoff is given by a function v : T ×B → R.
A.2 Signal sets are also product sets, L = LS × LT and M = MS ×MT , with ele-
ments denoted by l = (lS, lT ) and (mS,mT ). The random triples (s, lS,mS) and
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(t, lT ,mT ) are drawn independently of each other according to the distributions
p ∈ ∆(S × LS ×MS) and q ∈ ∆(T × LT ×MT ) respectively.4
Assumption A.1 ensures that the game is one of pure informational externalities.
Player 1 cares about player 2’s behavior only to the extent that player 2’s behavior
conveys information about s.
The independence assumption A.2 is often made in games with two-sided incom-
plete information, see, e.g., Zamir (1992). Not only does it imply that the two states
s and t are independent, but also that the two private signals, say of player 1, lS
and lT , are independent. The first component lS of player 1’s private signal should
be thought of as the information received by player 1 on his own state s, while the
second component lT is player 1’s information on player 2’s state, t.
5 Besides allowing
for tractability, assumption A.2 implies that behaving myopically is an equilibrium.
That is, assume that player 1 repeatedly plays an action a? that maximizes the ex-
pectation of u(s, a), given lS. Then, by A.2, the belief held by player 2 over his own
state does not change along the play, and it is a best reply for player 2 to repeatedly
play an action b? that maximizes the expectation of v(t, b), given mT . And vice-versa.
If instead the two states s and t were correlated, then the choice of a? might be infor-
mative about t, and may lead to a change in player 2’s action, which would in turn
be informative about s. But then, to manipulate this informational feedback, player
1 might be tempted to ‘mis-represent’ his myopically action a?. Such an example is
provided in Section 3.2. Assumption A.2 assumes away these effects.
In a sense, assumptions A.1 and A.2 imply that the only motive for disclosing
information on the other player’s state is to get back information in exchange: no
information will ever be exchanged, unless out of purely strategic reasons. We stress
that, although the triples (s, lS,mS) and (t, lT ,mT ) are independent, we make no
assumption on the distributions p and q. Thus, the two signals relative to a given
state may be correlated in an arbitrary way among themselves, or with the state
itself.
The main question that we ask is whether and to what extent valuable information
can be exchanged at equilibrium, and how to organize the exchange of information
4Here, the state of the world is (s, t), the signal to player 1 is (lS , lT ), and the signal to player 2
is (mS ,mT ). We will refer to s (resp., to t) as to player 1’s state (resp., player 2’s state).
5The subscripts in lS , lT serve a mnemonic purpose. We use boldface letters to denote random
variables, when we fear confusion might be at stake.
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along the play, while meeting equilibrium requirements. Our main result consists of a
characterization of the limit set of sequential equilibrium payoffs, as players become
patient.
Strategies will be denoted by σ and τ for players 1 and 2 respectively. A be-
havior strategy of player i maps his private information and the public history of
past moves, into a mixed action. Accordingly, behavior strategies are maps σ :
L × H → ∆(A) and τ : M × H → ∆(B), where H = ∪n≥0(A × B)n is the
set of finite sequences of moves. A strategy pair (σ, τ) induces a probability dis-
tribution over the set of (infinite) plays. Expectations under this distribution are
denoted by Ep,q,σ,τ . Thus, the expected discounted payoff of player 1 is given by
γ1δ (p, q, σ, τ) = Ep,q,σ,τ [(1− δ)
∑∞
n=1 δ
n−1u(s, an)]. We denote by pn ∈ ∆(S×MS) the
belief held by player 1 at stage n: it is the conditional distribution of the pair (s,mS),
given l, and the (public) sequence of previous moves. Note that p1 depends only on
l, because there is no history of moves prior to stage 1. However, the computation of
pn involves player 2’s strategy for n > 1. We denote by qn ∈ ∆(T ×LT ) the belief of
player 2 at stage n on his state of nature and on the signal that player 1 received on
this state of nature.
1.2 Preliminaries
Loosely put, our main result is the following. Provided that each player holds infor-
mation that is valuable to the other player, and that players are patient, any feasible
and individually rational payoff is a sequential equilibrium payoff. Before we state
formally this result, we list some preliminary remarks, and give few definitions.
1.2.1 Myopically optimal payoffs
Given a probability distribution pi ∈ ∆(S) and an action a ∈ A, we write u(pi, a) for
the expected payoff of player 1 when holding the belief pi and playing action a:
u(pi, a) = Epi[u(·, a)] =
∑
s∈S
pi(s)u(s, a).
We will often abuse notation and write u(pi, a) whenever pi is a distribution over a
product space of the form S × Q, for some finite set Q. In that case, u(pi, a) =
7
∑
s∈S
pi({s} ×Q)u(s, a). Given a distribution pi ∈ ∆(S), the myopically optimal payoff
when holding the belief pi is
u?(pi) := max
a∈A
u(pi, a). (1)
For a given a ∈ A, the map pi 7→ u(pi, a) is affine. As a supremum of finitely many
affine functions, the map u? is convex and piecewise linear. An action a ∈ A is optimal
at pi if it achieves the maximum in (1).
Recall that p1 ∈ ∆(S ×MS) is the (interim) belief of player 1 prior to stage 1.
Thus, the probability p1(s,mS) assigned to (s,mS) is equal to p(s,mS|lS). A myopic
strategy of player 1 is a strategy σm that repeats the same, optimal action at p1. The
(ex ante) payoff induced by σm does not depend on player 2’s strategy, and is equal
to
u? := Ep [u?(p1)] =
∑
lS∈LS
p(lS)u?(p(·|lS)).
If player 2’s strategy does not depend on mS, the belief of player 1 does not change
along the play: pn = p1 for each n ≥ 1. In such a case, the expected payoff of player
1 does not exceed u?. Thus, u? is the minmax value for player 1 in the repeated game.
For similar reasons,
v? := Ep [v?(q1)] =
∑
mT∈MT
q(mT )v?(q(·|mT ))
is the minmax value for player 2.
Player 1’s payoff is highest when he knows all he may possibly know about s, given
the rules of the game,6 that is, when player 2’s signal mS is made public. Player 1’s
belief is then denoted by p˜ ∈ ∆(S); thus, p˜(s) = p(s|lS,mS), for each state s ∈ S.
Conditional on both signals lS and mS, player 1’s optimal payoff is u?(p˜). Therefore,
player 1’s ex ante expected payoff does not exceed
u?? := Ep[u?(p˜)] =
∑
lS∈LS ,mS∈MS
p(lS,mS)u?(p(·|lS,mS)).
Since u? is convex, one has u?? ≥ u?. This reflects the fact that the marginal value
of the information held by player 2 is nonnegative.
6This can be formally deduced from Blackwell Theorem [6].
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Conversely, any payoff in [u?, u??) is a feasible payoff for player 1, provided players
are patient. Therefore, the (limit) set of feasible and individually rational payoffs for
player 1 is the interval [u?, u??].
Similarly, we define q˜ = q(·|lT ,mT ) and v?? := Eq[v?(q˜)]. As for player 1, the limit
set of feasible and individually rational payoffs for player 2 is the interval [v?, v??].
The example discussed in the introduction will serve as a leading example. Here,
all four sets S, T , A and B are equal to {0, 1}. Payoffs are given by u(s, a) = 1 if
s = a, and u(s, a) = 0 if s 6= a (resp., v(t, b) = 1 if t = b, and v(t, b) = 0 if t 6= b). We
will refer to this setup as the Binary Example, and we will use it repeatedly, with
various information structures. Note that the myopically optimal action is a = 1 if
and only if the belief assigned by player 1 to s = 1 is at least 1/2.
Binary Example 1 Assume here that LS is a singleton, while player 2 observes s
(that is, MS = S, and p(s,mS) = 0 if s 6= mS). The belief of player 1 can be identified
with the probability pi assigned to state 1, and u?(pi) = max{pi, 1 − pi}. On the other
hand, since player 2 observes s, p˜ is either 0 or 1, and u?? = 1.
1.2.2 Valuable information
A player will not be willing to play a myopically suboptimal action unless he expects
to receive information in return, the marginal value of which offsets the cost incurred
when playing the suboptimal action. In particular, a necessary condition for improv-
ing upon (u?, v?) is that each player holds information that is valuable to the other
player.
We stress that it is not enough that each player holds information on the other
player’s state. Indeed, if, e.g., the two signals ls and ms coincide p-a.s., player 1
already knows all player 2 knows relative to s. Nor is it enough that players have
private information, as the next example shows.
Binary Example 2 Assume that p(s = 1) = 3
4
and that player 2 receives a binary
signal mS which (conditional on s) is correct with probability
2
3
. Assume moreover
that LS is a singleton, so that player 1 has no information and p1 = p =
3
4
, and
u? =
3
4
. By Bayes’ rule, the posterior probability p˜ assigned to state 1 is equal to
p˜ = 6
7
if mS = 1, and is equal to
3
5
if mS = 0. In either case, the optimal action at
p˜ is a = 1, and, therefore, knowing the information of player 2 will not change the
9
optimal behavior of player 1: the information held by player 2 is valueless. Note that
u?? = E[u(p˜, 1)] = u(p, 1) = u?, where the middle equality holds by the law of iterated
expectations.
In the previous example, the information held by player 2 is valueless because it
does not affect player 1’s optimal action. Indeed, the precision of player 2’s signal
is lower than the prior evidence that the state is 1, hence player 2’s signal cannot
provide decisive evidence against state 1.
This observation motivates the definition below.
Definition 1 The information of player 2 is valuable for player 1, if
E [u? (p˜) |lS] > u?(p1), with p− probability 1. (2)
Similarly, the information of player 1 is valuable for player 2 if E[v?(q˜)|mT ] >
v?(q1), with q-probability 1.
Condition (2) is an interim requirement: it is equivalent to requiring that, after
learning lS, player 1 assigns positive probability to the event that his optimal action
would change, if player 2’s signal mS were made public.
This condition implies that u?? > u?, but it is not implied by this inequality.
Indeed, the latter condition is an ex ante requirement, that amounts to requiring
that E [u? (p˜) |lS] > u?(p1) holds with positive p-probability.
Definition 1 does not provide a measure of information value, but only a criterium
for deciding whether the information held by a player has positive value or not.
Note that this criterium involves player 1’s utility function u, and is therefore game-
dependent.
1.3 Main result
Our main result is the following.
Main Theorem 1 Assume that the information of each player is valuable to the
other player. Then, as δ → 1, the set of sequential equilibrium payoffs converges to
the set [u?, u??]× [v?, v??].
The proof of Theorem 1 is provided in the Appendix. Formally we prove that
given any compact set W ⊂ (u?, u??)× (v?, v??), there is δ0 < 1 such that each vector
in W is a sequential equilibrium payoff of the δ-discounted game, as soon as δ ≥ δ0.
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Note that player 1’s expected payoff does not exceed (1 − δ)u? + δu??, because
player 1’s action in stage 1 is based only upon l. It will follow from the proof of
Theorem 1 that equilibrium payoffs as high as u?? − (1 − δ)c can be implemented
in the δ-discounted game, for some constant c. These two estimates give a rate of
convergence of the set of equilibrium payoffs in the δ-discounted game.
The conclusion of the theorem is still valid when players hold different discount
factors, which converge to 1.
A few comments are in order. The theorem gives a sharp answer to the question
we posed. There exist equilibria, in which almost all information can be exchanged,
with a negligible delay, in spite of the fact that information exchange must be gradual
and open-ended. This stands in sharp contrast to conclusions obtained in dynamic
models of public good contribution, see Compte and Jehiel (2004). The driving force
that explains this contrast is the following. Here, the cost of disclosing information is
the opportunity cost of playing a suboptimal action, while the amount of information
depends on the evolution of beliefs and, therefore, on the extent to which actions are
correlated with private information. As a result, cost and amount are disentangled.
By contrast, in a public good model, there is a one-to-one relation between the cost
of a given monetary contribution, and the amount contributed.
When the information, say, of player 2, has a positive ex ante value (u?? > u?),
but is not valuable according to Definition 1, the conclusion of the theorem does not
hold. Indeed, whenever the signal lS received by player 1 fails to satisfy inequality
(2), player 1 will infer (at the interim stage) that the information held by player 2
has no value. Then, player 1 will not be willing to disclose any information to player
2, although the information he holds may be valuable to player 2. In Section 3, we
extend the characterization of the theorem to cover such cases.
The extension to an arbitrary number of players is outside of the scope of this
paper. With more than two players, there exist cases where some player i holds no
private information, yet receives information in equilibrium. The basic intuition is
that player i may be ‘rewarded’ by some other player j, for information that has been
disclosed to j by a third player k.
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2 The Binary Example
We here explain the main ideas of the equilibrium construction within the binary
setup. For simplicity, we assume here that as in the example in the Introduction,
each player knows exactly the other player’s state.7
All equilibria share the feature that each player starts by reporting truthfully his
private signal relative on his own state, lS and mT respectively. The rationale for
this report is the following. In the continuation game, no player then holds private
information on his own state. Consequently, player i will always know the posterior
belief of player j on j’s state. This in turn allows player i to compute the perceived
cost incurred by player j when playing either action, and to adjust accordingly the
amount of information he discloses. Of course, adequate incentives will have to be
provided to ensure truthful reporting.
We first deal with games in which players get no information on their own state,
which we call self-ignorant games. We next explain how to provide incentives for
a truthful report in the general case. The discussion of how to combine these two
logically independent steps is relegated to the Appendix.
2.1 The self-ignorant case
In this section, we analyze the game discussed in the introduction. The states s and
t are drawn according to p ∈ ∆(S) and q ∈ ∆(T ). Player 1 is told t, and player
2 is told s. Hence, p (and q) may be viewed as a distribution over S = {0, 1}. We
identify any distribution over S (resp., over T ) with the probability assigned to state
s = 1 (resp., to state t = 1). For concreteness, we assume that p and q are such that
p, q > 1
2
.
2.1.1 A first equilibrium profile
We here describe one specific equilibrium profile that will serve as a building block
for the general construction. In this profile, the play is divided into two phases.
In the first phase, at odd stages (resp. at even stages) player 1 (resp. player 2)
randomizes, thereby transmitting information to player 2 (resp. to player 1), while
player 2 (resp. player 1) plays his myopically optimal action. The second phase starts
7That is, lT = t with q-probability 1, and mS = s with p-probability 1.
12
when the player who is randomizing plays his myopically optimal action, and lasts ad
infinitum. Along this phase both players play their myopically optimal action. Thus,
the play path looks as follows: in the first few stages the players alternately play their
myopically suboptimal action, and then the play switches to myopic play.
Randomizations are informative: in stage 1 for instance, the mixed action used
by player 1 depends on t, so that the belief of player 2 in stage 2 depends on player
1’s action in stage 1.
The play in the first phase has a cyclic pattern, with period 4. The evolution of
beliefs along the play is illustrated in Figure 1. This figure involves two parameters,
p? and q?, which will later be pinned down by equilibrium requirements.
p, q
p, 1− q
p, q∗
1− p, 1− q
p∗, 1− q
1− p, q
1− p, 1− q∗
p, q
1− p∗, q
p, 1− q
p, q∗
a0
b1
a1
b0
a0
a1
b0
a0
b1
a1
Stage 1 Stage 2 Stage 3 Stage 4 Stage 5
Figure 1: The play as long as both players play suboptimally.
How to read this figure? Consider first stage 1. In stage 1, player 2 plays with
probability 1 his optimal action (which is b = 1 since q > 1
2
). Consequently, the belief
of player 1 in stage 2 is p, the same as in stage 1. Meanwhile, player 1 plays his
suboptimal action a = 0 with probability xt. The values of x0 and x1 are defined to
be x1 := x¯ =
1− q
q
× q
? − q
q + q? − 1 and x0 := x =
q
1− q ×
q? − q
q + q? − 1, where q
? will be
defined below. By Bayesian updating, the posterior belief q2 of player 2 in stage 2 is
equal to 1−q < 1
2
following a = 0, and is equal to q? > q following a = 1. In player 2’s
eyes, the suboptimal action a = 0 is played with probability x := qx¯+(1−q)x = 1−δ
δ2
.
Note that x and q? solve q = x(1 − q) + (1 − x)q?, which reflects the martingale
property of beliefs. Because q > 1/2 it follows that q? > q and therefore x1 < x0.
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Consider next stage 2. If player 1 played his optimal action a = 1 in stage 1,
players stop exchanging information, and repeat forever their optimal actions, a = 1
and b = 1. If player 1 played his suboptimal action a = 0, player 2 reciprocates
and assigns a probability ys to his suboptimal action (which is now b = 1 because
1 − q < 1
2
). The values of y0 and y1, are set to y1 := y¯ =
1− p
p
× p
? − p
p+ p? − 1 and
y0 := y =
p
1− p ×
p? − p
p+ p? − 1 (where p
? is defined below) so that the belief of player
1 in stage 3 is either p? or 1− p. The overall probability assigned to the action b = 1
is y := py¯ + (1− p)y, which solves p = y(1− p) + (1− y)p?.
Consider now stage 3 (assuming a = 0 was played in stage 1). If the optimal
action b = 0 was played in stage 2, players stop exchanging information and repeat
their optimal actions, a = 1 and b = 0. If player 2 played his suboptimal action
in stage 2, player 1 reciprocates and plays as in stage 1, only with the roles of the
states/actions exchanged. To be precise, player 1 assigns positive probability to his
suboptimal action (which is now a = 1 because 1 − p < 1
2
). As in stage 1, this
probability is set to x¯, if the true state t happens to be the state which player 2
currently considers more likely (which is now state t = 0 because q3 = 1 − q < 12),
and it is set to x otherwise. By Bayesian updating, the belief of player 2 in stage 4 is
either q or 1− q?. And so on.
Observable deviations8 by player i are ignored by player j.
The value of p? is dictated by equilibrium requirements. Observe first that, at
equilibrium and at any node where player 1 is supposed to randomize, his expected
continuation payoff must be equal to u?(p). Indeed, consider any such node, say at
stage 2n + 1. If he plays his optimal action, player 1 gets an expected payoff of
u?(p2n+1) in stage 2n+ 1, and in all future stages as well, since the players then stop
to exchange information. Note that u?(p2n+1) = u?(p), because p2n+1 is either equal
to p or 1− p, depending wether n is even or odd. Because he is randomizing, player
1 should be indifferent between both actions, and the claim follows.
Let us now consider stage 1. If player 1 plays his suboptimal action in stage 1, his
continuation payoff from stage 3 on, is equal to u?(p) if player 2 plays b = 1 in stage
2, and to u?(p
?) if player 2 plays b = 0. Since the probabilities of these two events
8Such deviations consist in playing the currently suboptimal action at a node at which the optimal
action was expected.
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are equal to y and 1− y respectively, the overall payoff of player 1 is then equal to
(1− δ)(1− u?(p)) + δ(1− δ)u?(p) + δ2 (yu?(p) + (1− y)u?(p?)) ,
where the first two terms are the contributions of the first two stages to the overall
payoff. When equating this last expression with u?(p), and using p >
1
2
, one obtains
p? = p+ (2p− 1) 1− δ
δ2 + δ − 1 .
The same argument, when applied to player 2, yields q? = q + (2q − 1) 1− δ
δ2 + δ − 1.
The parameter values p?, q?, x¯, x, y¯, y all lie in (0, 1) as soon as εδ ≤ p, q ≤ 1− εδ,
where εδ =
1−δ
δ2+δ−1 ; that is, as soon as initial beliefs are not too precise. Note that εδ
goes to 0 as δ goes to 1.
Conversely, and whenever εδ ≤ p, q ≤ 1− εδ, this profile is a Nash equilibrium of
the repeated game. Observe that, while player 1’s payoff is u?(p), the payoff of player
2 is equal to
f(q) := (1− δ)v?(q) + δ (xv?(q) + (1− x)v?(q?))
= v?(q) +
1− δ
δ
(2v?(q)− 1) > v?(q).
2.1.2 Further equilibrium payoffs
We here build upon the previous section, and introduce a class of simple equilibrium
profiles, that implement all equilibrium payoffs (in the limit δ → 1).
In these equilibria, most of the information on player 2’s state that player 1 will
ever transmit is transmitted at stage 1 by randomizing in that stage, and similarly,
most of the information on player 1’s state that player 2 will ever transmit is transmit-
ted in stage 2. From stage 3 on, the players either implement the equilibrium profile
defined in the previous section, or switch to a myopic behavior. The equilibrium that
is implemented from stage 3 on depends on the cost of information transmission in
stages 1 and 2.
We will now be more precise. Let q¯, q, p¯0, p0, p¯1 and p1 be arbitrary beliefs in
(0, 1), such that 0 < q ≤ 1
2
< q < q¯ < 1, and 0 < pa ≤ 1
2
< p < p¯a < 1 for
a ∈ {0, 1}. A further condition will be imposed later. We let the discount factor δ
be sufficiently large such that all six beliefs, which are determined below, lie in the
interval (εδ, 1− εδ).
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Player 1 randomizes in stage 1, and plays his optimal action in stage 2. Player
2 plays his optimal action in stage 1, and randomizes in stage 2. We choose these
state-dependent randomizations in such a way that the beliefs of the players evolve
as indicated in Figure 2. Continuation payoffs from stage 3 also appear on this figure.
Observe that the optimal action of player 2 in stage 2 depends on the action played
by player 1 in stage 1, since q ≤ 1
2
< q¯.
p, q
p, q
p, q
p1, q: information exchange; continuation payoffs u?(p
0), f(q)
p1, q: myopic play; continuation payoffs u?(p
0), v?(q)
p2, q: information exchange; continuation payoffs u?(p
1), f(q)
p2, q: myopic play; continuation payoffs u?(p
1), v?(q)
a0
a1
b1
b0
b0
b1
Figure 2: The beliefs in the first three stages.
Since all beliefs lie in (εδ, 1 − εδ), this strategy profile is well-defined. As an
example, consider the top final node in Figure 2. At that node, players’ beliefs are p¯1
and q¯, and players switch to the equilibrium profile which we designed in the previous
section, taking p¯1 and q¯ as initial beliefs.
We claim that equilibrium conditions for player 2 are satisfied. Indeed, note that
the function f(·) solves
v?(q˜) = (1− δ)(1− v?(q˜)) + δf(q˜), for each q˜ ∈ [0, 1].
Hence, whatever be the action played by player 1 in stage 1, player 2 is indifferent
between his two actions at stage 2, as desired.
The overall payoff to player 2 is equal to (1− δ)v?(q) + δ
(
xv?(q¯) + (1− x)v?(q)
)
.
As δ goes to 1, the weight of the first stage decreases to 0. Since q and q¯ were
arbitrary, this payoff spans the whole interval (q, 1) = (v?, v??).
It remains to ensure that player 1 is indifferent between both actions in stage 1.
That is, the difference in payoffs in stage 1 should be offset by a difference in the
expected continuation payoffs. This is done by adjusting the amount of information
disclosed by player 2 in stage 2 to the action played by player 1 in stage 1: more
information is disclosed if player 1 plays his suboptimal action in stage 1.
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Formally, the indifference condition translates to:
(1−δ)(u?(p)−(1− u?(p))) = δ2(y0u?(p¯0)+(1−y0)u?(p0))−δ2(y1u?(p¯1)+(1−y1)u?(p1)).
(3)
A necessary condition is that p0, p¯0 be chosen such that the overall payoff when playing
the suboptimal action in stage 1 is at least u?(p). Conversely, one can check that for
any such choice of p0, p¯0, there exist p1, p¯1 ∈ (p0, p¯0) such that equation (3) holds.
The overall payoff to player 1 is then equal to
(1− δ)(1− u?(p)) + δ(1− δ)u?(p) + δ2
(
y0u?(p¯
0) + (1− y0)u?(p0)
)
.
A δ goes to 1, the weight of the first two stages decreases to zero. Since p0, p¯0 are
arbitrary (subject to the individual rationality condition), this payoff spans the whole
interval (p, 1) = (u?, v??).
2.2 The self-informed case
While sticking to the binary setup, we now allow for private signals on one’s own state,
and we informally describe the main ideas of the construction. All details appear in
the Appendix. All equilibria share a common structure. Equilibrium play is divided
into four successive phases.
In phase 1, players 1 and 2 report their signals lS and mT , by means of encoding
them into finite strings of actions in a one-to-one way.
The crucial phase is Phase 2. It is designed so as to provide incentives for truthfully
reporting in phase 1. In expectation, very little information is exchanged in that
phase. It is organized as follows. Each player i draws a random message,9 and ‘sends’
it to player j (again, by encoding messages into sequences of actions). This message
is slightly correlated with player j’s state, but is independent of the report of player
j in phase 1.10 Next, player j plays a long and deterministic sequence of actions.
We refer to these two subphases as phases 2.1 and 2.2 respectively. The length of
phase 2 is of the order of ln(1− θ)/ ln δ for some positive θ, hence phase 2 contributes
a fraction of θ to the total discounted payoff.11 The prescribed sequence of actions
9We distinguish between signals, drawn by nature, and messages, chosen by the players and
possibly subject to strategic considerations.
10Even if drawn independently of player j’s report, it is crucial that it is sent only after player j’s
report.
11The value of θ is independent of δ, but may have to be adjusted to the equilibrium payoff.
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depends both on player j’s report in phase 1, and on player i’s message in phase 2.
The intuition behind this structure is discussed later.
In the continuation game that starts after phase 2, players hold no private in-
formation about their own state and they implement an equilibrium of the resulting
self-ignorant game. The bulk of valuable information exchange takes place in phase
3. Each player i draws a random message that is correlated with player j’s state, and
‘sends’ it to player j. The degree of correlation is adjusted as a function of player j’s
equilibrium payoff. The (conditional) law of player i’s message does not depend on
player j’s report.
Phase 4 consists of the remaining stages. Prior to the first stage, N , of phase
4, each player i assesses the belief held by player j, assuming reports in phase 1
were truthful. He also assesses the total discounted cost incurred by player j in all
previous stages – with the exception of the stages of phase 2.2. Players switch to
the equilibrium profile, as designed in the previous section, which is associated with
a payoff equal to the myopic payoff, (u?(pN), v?(qN)), plus a bonus that exactly
offsets the cost incurred earlier. Because few stages are taken into account for the
computation of the past cost, this bonus is at most of the order of (1− δ)c, for some
positive c. Because it is small, hardly any valuable information is exchanged during
phase 4. The role of the bonus is to ensure that each player, when randomizing in
either phase 2 or phase 3, is indifferent between all messages.
Observable deviations of player i trigger a myopic play of player j.
We now provide a few insights into phase 2, by means of two examples. Phase 2
is designed so that the expected payoff of a player in phase 2.2 is strictly higher when
reporting truthfully than when not.
Assume first that LS = {lS, l¯S}, and that player 1 assigns to state s = 1 a
posterior probability 1
3
when observing lS, and
2
3
when observing l¯S. Note that the
optimal action of player 1 is a = 0 in the former case, and a = 1 in the latter case.
Here, incentives can be provided by simply requiring that player 1 repeats the action
which is optimal given the signal he reported. Indeed, assume for concreteness that
player 1 receives lS = lS. If player 1 reports truthfully lS and plays as required the
action a = 0, his expected payoff is 2
3
in all stages of phase 2.2. If instead player
1 untruthfully claims that he received l¯S and next plays the action a = 1, which is
optimal given his report but in fact suboptimal, his expected payoff is only 1
3
. Such
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an incentive scheme is appropriate whenever the myopically optimal action of player
1 is in one-to-one relation with lS.
In some cases, more complex schemes are needed. Assume that LS = {lS, l?S, l¯S},
and that the posterior probability assigned to state s = 1 is respectively 1
3
following
lS,
1
2
following l?S and
2
3
following l¯S. Here, conditional on s, we let player 2 send a
message µ in {∗, 0, 1}. The probability of µ = ∗ is close to 1, and does not depend on
s, so that this message conveys no information. Conditional on µ 6= ∗, the message
µ coincides with s with probability 1 − ε, where ε > 0 is small. Next, player 1 is to
repeat a sequence ~a of actions of length 8, which depends on both report and disclosed
state:
• If µ = ∗, the sequence ~a is independent of player 1’s report;
• Following a report of l?S, the sequence ~a contains four 0’s (and four 1’s), irre-
spective of the message sent by player 2;
• Following a report of lS, ~a contains six 0’s (and two 1’s) if the player 2’s message
is µ = 0, and seven 0’s if µ = 1;
• Following a report of l¯S, ~a contains six 1’s if µ = 1, and seven 1’s µ = 0.
It is straightforward that strict incentive requirements are met for ε > 0 small
enough.
We conclude by explaining the equilibrium logic. Assuming that player i chooses
to truthfully report in phase 1, the computation of the continuation profile in phase
4 ensures that player i is indifferent between all messages in phases 2.1 and 3, and
has no profitable deviation in phase 4. However, the prescribed sequence of actions in
phase 2.2 may involve suboptimal actions,12 and player i may consider deviating from
this sequence. Such a deviation fails to be profitable as soon as the marginal value of
the information received in phase 3 compensates the cost incurred along phase 2.2.
This condition puts a (mild) constraint on the relation between the duration of phase
2 and the amount of information disclosed in phase 3.
What if player 1, say, chooses instead to mis-report his signal in phase 1, and
claims that he received the signal l′S when in fact receiving lS? If lS and l
′
S are
12The cost of which is not taken into account in the bonus.
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equivalent, in the sense that the belief of player 1 is the same following either signal:
p(·|lS) = p(·|l′S) ∈ ∆(S), such a deviation is irrelevant.13 Hence, assume that player 1
reports a signal l′S that is not equivalent to lS, and plays consistently with his report
thereafter.14 Three properties combine to ensure that such a deviation fails to be
profitable. First, observe that the joint distribution of the two messages received
from player 2 (in phases 2 and 3) does not depend on player 1’s report. Hence,
misreporting does not affect the information received from player 2 in phases 2 and 3.
Next, observe that the continuation strategy of player 2 in phase 4 entails almost no
information disclosure. As we show in the Appendix, this implies that the best-reply
continuation payoff of player 1 in phase 4, is at most u?(pN) + (1 − δ)C, for some
positive C, where pN is the ‘true’ belief of player 1. That is, in spite of the fact that
player 2’s continuation strategy is based on a wrong assessment of player 1’s belief,15
the maximal gain for player 1 is very small. Finally, by design, the expected payoff
received by player 1 in phase 2 is strictly higher when reporting lS than l
′
S.
Because the weight of phase 2 in the total payoff is θ, the small gain obtained in
phase 4 can not offset the loss incurred in phase 2.2 when reporting l′S rather than lS.
3 Extensions and concluding comments
3.1 Ex ante vs. interim valuable information
We here discuss how to adapt the statement of the Main Theorem to a situation in
which information is ex ante valuable, but need not be interim valuable. That is, we
assume that both inequalities u? < u?? and v? < v?? hold, but that the information
held by player i need not be valuable in the sense of Definition 1.
We will assume that with p-probability 1, player 1 has a unique myopically optimal
action at p1, and that the symmetric property.
16 holds for player 2 Define L¯S ⊂ LS
13We note that the definition of equivalent signals adopted here is quite specific to the binary case,
and will be different in the general case.
14The case where player 1 fails to play consistently, and deviates from the prescribed sequence
will pose no specific problem. It is left to the appendix.
15Because it is assuming that player 1 reported truthfully.
16If a player has two myopically optimal actions at p1, he can costlessly reveal information to the
other player.
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to be the set of signals lS for which the inequality (2) does not hold, and define
M¯T ⊂MT in a symmetric way. We argue that the limit set of sequential equilibrium
payoffs is equal to the set
E := [u?, u?q(M¯T ) + u??q(MT \ M¯T )]× [v?, v?p(L¯S) + v??p(LS \ L¯S)].
Observe first that at any equilibrium, if mT ∈ M¯T , player 2 realizes (interim) that
the information held by player 1 has no value, and player 2 will then repeat his
unique, optimal action at q1. Thus, conditional on mT , and using the independence
assumption A.2, player 1’s expected payoff is at most u? if mT ∈ M¯T , and at most u??
if mT /∈ M¯T . Using the same argument for player 2, this shows that any equilibrium
payoff vector lies in the set E.
Conversely, consider the following class of strategy profiles. In the first two stages,
each player i ‘tells’ player j whether the information held by j has positive value to
i or not. This is done as follows. In stage 1, player i plays his myopically optimal
action. In stage 2, player 1, say, repeats this action if lS ∈ L¯S, and switches to a
different (suboptimal) action if lS /∈ L¯S to signal his willingness to disclose/acquire
information. If both players switched in stage 2, they implement from stage 3 on
an equilibrium such as we designed in the proof of the Main Theorem. Otherwise,
players repeat their stage 1 action. The sole role of stage 1 is to instruct the other
player how to interpret the action played in stage 2.
If ls ∈ L¯S, it is strictly dominant for player 1 to repeat his optimal action through-
out, as required. Indeed, playing a different action in stage 2 would only lower player
1’s payoff, with no benefit since player 2’s information is valueless.
If ls ∈ LS\L¯S, player 1’s overall payoff is u?(p1) if he pretends that the information
held by player 2 is valueless. However, because there is a positive q-probability that
mT /∈ M¯T , it is a best reply for player 1 to switch to a suboptimal action in stage 2
as soon as the value of the information disclosed by player 2 exceeds on average the
cost incurred in stage 2.17
In such an equilibrium, conditional on lS, player 1’s payoff is u?(p1), which is
then also equal to E[u?(p˜)|lS], if lS ∈ L¯S. If instead lS /∈ L¯S, then with probability
q(MT \ M¯T ), player 1’s payoff may be as high as E[u?(p˜)|lS]. Otherwise, player 1’s
payoff will be (approximately) u?(p1). The ex ante expected payoff can therefore be
17It cannot be optimal for player 1 to pretend that lS /∈ L¯S , yet to lie about his optimal action.
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as high as
u?q(M¯T ) + q(MT \ M¯T )u??.
3.2 The correlated case
The case where the independence assumption A.2 does not hold raises significant
challenges. For the sake of simplicity, we focus here on the binary setup.
A first difficulty is that myopic play need not be an equilibrium. Hence it is not
clear what is the lowest equilibrium payoff.
Binary Example 3 Here, states and signals are functions of an auxiliary variable
ω, which can assume four different possible values ωi, i ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}. The probabilities
of the different values, and the way ω determines the states and signals is as follows:
state of state of
state of nature s of nature t of signal l of signal m of
the world prob. player 1 player 2 player 1 player 2
ω1
1
6
0 0 l1 m1
ω2
1
3
0 0 l2 m1
ω3
1
3
1 0 l1 m2
ω4
1
6
1 1 l2 m2
When behaving in a myopically optimal way, players play as follows. In stage 1,
player 2 plays b = 0. Indeed, the probability he assigns to state t = 0 is either 1 or 2
3
.
Meanwhile, player 1 plays a = 1 if l = l1, and a = 0 if l = l2. Indeed, the probability
assigned to state s = 0 is 1
3
in the former case, and 2
3
in the latter case. In stage 2,
player 1 repeats his stage 1 action. On the other hand, player 2 can deduce ω from
player 1’s stage 1 choice. If player 1 played a = 1, player 2 repeats his stage 1 action.
If instead player 1 played a = 0, player 2 will play either b = 0 or b = 1, depending
on player 2’s information. In the former case, players repeat forever their stage 2
action. In the latter, player 1 deduces ω from player 2 stage 2’s action, and obtains
a payoff of 1 in all later stages. This obviously creates an incentive for player 1 to
deviate in stage 1, and to always play a = 0, in order to learn the value of ω in stage
3. Thus, it is not an equilibrium to behave myopically. In this example, information
exchange is a consequence of equilibrium behavior.
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A second difficulty lies in understanding the extent to which information can be
exchanged. In Section 2.1.1 we described specific periodic equilibria. In fact, there
are many degrees of freedom in this construction, and the choice of using periodic
equilibria was made to facilitate the computation of the equilibrium requirements. It
turns out that when information is correlated there are no degrees of freedom in deter-
mining the beliefs, and the sequence of beliefs is not periodic: it satisfies uninspiring
recursive equations, that do not seem to have closed-form solutions. Preliminary nu-
merical evidence seems to suggest that some equilibria can be constructed along these
lines.
3.3 The finite horizon case
We here comment on the assertion that the exchange of information relies on the
horizon being unbounded. We argue that, when the horizon is finite, the myopic
equilibrium is the unique Nash equilibrium of the binary example, as soon as p1 6= 12
p-a.s., and q1 6= 12 q-a.s. This claim is an illustration that in many cases of interest,
a bounded horizon prevents players from exchanging information.
Let T be the length of the game, and let a Nash equilibrium be given. We prove
that, for any sequence hn of length n ≥ 0 of moves that occur with positive probability,
the continuation payoff of player 1 is u?(pn) if qn 6= 12 , and the continuation payoff of
player 2 is v?(qn) if pn 6= 12 . We argue by backward induction over n. The claim holds
trivially for n = T . Assume that the claim holds for every history of length n + 1,
and consider a history of length n such that qn 6= 12 . We proceed in two steps.
Step 1: We claim that E[u?(pn+1)|hn] = u?(pn).
Note first that the claim trivially holds if player 2 does not randomize following
hn, since one then has pn+1 = pn with probability 1.
Assume now that player 2 randomizes at stage n following hn. Observe that
pn+1 must then be equal to
1
2
with positive probability. Otherwise, by the induction
hypothesis the continuation payoff of player 2 would be v?(qn+1), irrespective of the
action played by player 2 in stage n. But then player 2 would not be indifferent in
stage n between the two actions – a contradiction.
It follows that both possible values of pn+1 lie in the same half of the interval
[0, 1]. The claim follows, because E[pn+1|hn] = pn and because u? is linear in both
[0, 1
2
] and [1
2
, 1].
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Step 2: Conclusion
Since qn 6= 12 , the event qn+1 6= 12 has a positive probability conditional on hn. Let
a ∈ A be any action that is played with positive probability at hn, and following which
qn+1 6= 12 . When playing a and by the induction hypothesis, the continuation payoff of
player 1 in stage n+1 is equal to u?(pn+1). As a consequence, and when playing a, the
continuation payoff of player 1 in stage n is equal to (1−δ)u(pn, a)+E[u?(pn+1)|hn] ≤
u?(pn), using Step 1. By the equilibrium property, it follows that the continuation
payoff of player 1 in stage n (following hn) is equal to u?(pn).
We note, though, that there may be cases in which information exchange is pos-
sible, even when the game is finitely repeated.The following example illustrates this
point.
Consider the binary example, and add to each action set one more action, that
we denote by 2, and that yield payoff 2
3
irrespective of the state. The optimal action
of player 1, as a function of the belief assigned to state s = 1, is given by Figure 3
below, and the structure of player 2’s best-response is similar.
a0 a2 a1
0 1
3
2
3
1
Figure 3: The optimal action of player 1
Example 1 Assume that the two states are equally likely, and that player 1 learns t
while player 2 learns s. Suppose that in stage 1 player 1 plays [1
3
(a0),
2
3
(a1)] if t = 0,
and [2
3
(a0),
1
3
(a1)] if t = 1, and suppose that player 2 plays in an analog way. Player
1’s belief in stage 2 is either [1
3
(0), 2
3
(1)] or [2
3
(0), 1
3
(1)], depending on player 2’s action
in stage 1. In the former case, we let player 1 play either a0 or a2 depending on t. In
the latter case, we let player 1 play either a1 or a2, depending on t.
18 Let the behavior
of player 2 in stage 2 be analog. Provided δ is high enough, this strategy pair is an
equilibrium, in which players exchange all information in two stages.
The type of construction presented in Example 3.3 is valid only for intermediate
values of initial beliefs, and for self-ignorant games. Moreover, it is not clear how to
use such profiles as continuation profiles in general games.
18We let player 1 repeat a2 forever if player 2 played b2.
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3.4 Signals along the Play
How do our results change when players receive independent signals, both on their
own state and on the other player’s state, along the game? If player i receives signals
on his own state along the play, then, because he is patient, he will wait until almost
all the information that he can get about is own state is received. However, if in
subsequent stages he keeps on receiving information on his own state, then his belief
changes, even though the changes are small. These changes have the effect that the
other player does not know how to compensate player i for playing suboptimally, and
our construction fails.
If, on the other hand, player i received signals on the other player’s state along the
game, then again the players can wait until player i receives almost all the information
that he can, and then the players can implement the equilibrium that we construct.
Thus, our results remain valid in this case.
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A Self-Ignorant Games
We assume throughout the Appendix that all payoffs are in [0, 1]. In this section we
assume that no player receives private information on his own state. Equivalently,
both sets LS and MT are singletons. For simplicity, we here write L and M instead
of LT and MS.
Let initial distributions p ∈ ∆(S×M) and q ∈ ∆(T ×L) be given. We denote the
corresponding game by Γ(p, q). W.l.o.g., we assume that p(m) > 0 for each m ∈M .19
We assume that the information of each player i is valuable to player j. Since
Γ(p, q) is a self-ignorant game, this is equivalent to assuming that there is no action
a ∈ A that is optimal at all distributions pm := p(·|m), m ∈ M . Equivalently, one
has
u? = u?(p) < u?? =
∑
m∈M
p(m)u? (pm) . (4)
By Bayes’ rule, the belief pn of player 1 at stage n is the weighted average of
{pm ⊗ 1m,m ∈M}, where the weight of pm ⊗ 1m is equal to the probability that the
signal of player 2 is m, given player 1’s information at stage n.20 Thus, the set of
possible values of pn is
∆†(S ×M) = conv{pm ⊗ 1m,m ∈M}. (5)
Because p(m) > 0, p lies in the (relative) interior of ∆†(S ×M), which we denote by
◦
∆
†
(S ×M). We define ql = q(·|l) for l ∈ L, and the set ∆†(T × L) is defined in a
symmetric way.
It is convenient to allow the initial distribution to vary, to account for the fact that
beliefs may change along the play. Since all beliefs lie in ∆†(S ×M) and ∆†(T × L),
we will only consider initial distributions in these sets. We still denote arbitrary such
distributions by p and q.
In this section, we prove the two propositions below.
19And that q(l) > 0 for each l ∈ L: to avoid useless repetitions, we sometimes state properties for
player 1, with the implicit understanding that analog properties hold for player 2 as well.
20This is a way of stating that, as the play proceeds, the belief of player 1 on m evolves, but the
distribution of s conditional on m remains fixed.
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Proposition 1 Let p ∈
◦
∆
†
(S ×M) and q ∈
◦
∆
†
(T × L) be given. There exists ε > 0
and δ¯ < 1 such that the following holds. For every δ ≥ δ¯, every payoff vector in
[u?(p), u?(p) + ε]× [v?(q), v?(q) + ε] is a sequential equilibrium payoff of Γ(p, q).
Given such p and q, a payoff vector γ ∈ [u?(p), u?(p) + ε]× [v?(q), v?(q) + ε], and
a discount factor δ, we will construct an equilibrium profile (σp,q,γ, τp,q,γ) in Γ(p, q),
with payoff γ. Proposition 2 bounds the possible gain of player 1 if player 2 has an
incorrect belief on p, provided γ is close to the myopically optimal payoff.
Proposition 2 Let p ∈
◦
∆
†
(S×M), q ∈
◦
∆
†
(T×L) and c > 0 be given. There exists a
constant C > 0 with the following property. For every discount factor δ, every payoff
vector γ such that ‖γ − (u?(p), v?(q))‖∞ ≤ (1− δ)c, and every p′ ∈ ∆†(S ×M), one
has
γ1(p′, q, σ, τp,q,γ) ≤ u?(p′) + (1− δ)C, for every strategy σ.
In Propositions 1 and 2, ε, C and δ¯ may depend a priori on the choice of (p, q). We
will prove that they can be chosen in such a way that the conclusions hold uniformly
throughout some neighborhoods of p and q.
A.1 Notations and Preliminaries
We here describe the main steps leading to the proof of Propositions 1 and 2. Our
goal is to mimic the recursive construction of the binary case. We let [p0, p1] be any
segment in the interior of ∆†(S×M) such that u? is not affine on the segment [p0, p1].
The beliefs p0 and p1 take the role of p and 1− p in the binary case.
An optimal action a at p0 is not optimal at p1 (and vice-versa). Otherwise, a
would be optimal throughout the segment [p0, p1], and then u? would coincide with
the affine map u(·, a) on that segment.
For k = 0, 1, we let ak ∈ A be an optimal action at pk. We denote by D1 the
straight line spanned by p0 and p1 in RS×M , and we denote by p and p¯ the endpoints
of the segment D1 ∩∆†(S ×M), with the convention of Figure 4.
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p1 p0
∆(S)
∆†(S)
Figure 4
Let pi ∈ [p0, p¯], and assume that player 1 receives information that changes his
belief from p0 to either p1 (with probability y) or pi (with probability 1− y). So that
the martingale property of beliefs holds we must have p0 = yp1 + (1 − y)pi. Assume
moreover that from the next stage on player 1 receives his myopically optimal payoff.
The gain of player 1 from the information that is revealed to him relative to his
myopically optimal payoff at p0, is then hp0(pi) = (yu?(p
1) + (1− y)u?(pi)) − u?(p0).
Since u? is convex, hp0(pi) ≥ 0 for each pi. Since u? is not affine on the interval [p0, p1],
one also has hp0(pi) > 0 for pi ∈ (p0, p¯], see Figure 5. In addition, hp0 is piecewise
affine, and non-decreasing as pi moves away from p0 towards p¯.
h1(y)
u?(p
0)
yu?(p
1) + (1− y)u?(py)
u∗
p p1 p0 py p
Figure 5
Similarly, define hp1 : [p
1, p]→ R+ by hp1(pi) = (yu?(p0) + (1− y)u?(pi))− u?(p1),
where y solves p1 = yp0 + (1− y)pi.
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We proceed in a symmetric way with player 2. We let [q0, q1] be an arbitrary
segment in the interior of ∆†(T × L) such that the restriction of v? to the segment
[q0, q1] is not an affine map. We denote by D2 the straight line in RT×L spanned by
q0 and q1, and by q, q¯ the endpoints of the segment D2∩∆†(T ×L). Finally, we define
hq0 : [q
0, q¯]→ R+ and hq1 : [q1, q]→ R+ by adapting the definitions of hp0 and hp1 .
Given a belief pi ∈ ∆(S ×M), and an action a ∈ A, the cost of a at pi is defined
as the loss incurred when playing a instead of the optimal action at pi:
c(pi, a) := u?(pi)− u(pi, a).
The cost c(pi, b), for pi ∈ ∆(T × L) and b ∈ B is defined analogously.
The proof of Propositions 1 and 2 relies on Lemmas 1 and 2 below.
Lemma 1 Let δ < 1 be such that
1− δ
δ
c(pi, aj) < maxhpi and
1− δ
δ
c(qi, bj) <
maxhqi, for i, j = 0, 1. Then the vector (u?(p
0), v?(q
0) + 1−δ
δ
c(q0, b1)) is a sequential
equilibrium payoff of Γ(p0, q0).
Lemma 2 Let ε > 0 be such that ε < maxhpi, and ε < maxhqj for i, j = 0, 1. There
is δ¯ < 1, such that for every discount factor δ ≥ δ¯, every payoff in [u?(p0), v?(q0) +
ε]× [v?(q0), v?(q0) + ε] is a sequential equilibrium payoff of Γ(p0, q0).
We will prove that the conclusion holds uniformly for all initial distributions p˜i,
q˜j close to pi and qj. To be precise, there exist a neighborhood V (pi) of pi, and
a neighborhood V (qj) of qj (i, j ∈ {0, 1}) such that, for every δ ≥ δ¯, and every
p˜i ∈ V (pi), q˜j ∈ V (qj), all vectors in [u?(p˜i), u?(p˜i) + ε] × [v?(q˜j), v?(q˜j) + ε] are
sequential equilibrium payoffs of Γ(p˜i, q˜j).
A.2 Proof of Lemma 1
In the construction of Section 2, the probabilities x and y assigned to suboptimal
actions were pinned down by equilibrium requirements. The construction here is
slightly more involved because the number of signals may be larger than 2.
We let δ be as stated. Define first p¯1 ∈ [p0, p¯) by the condition hp0(p¯1) =
1− δ
δ
c(p0, a1), and y1 ∈ [0, 1) by the equality p0 = y1p1 +(1−y1)p¯1. The revelation of
information just defined offsets the cost to player 1 of playing the suboptimal action
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a1 when the belief if p0. p¯1 takes the role of p? in the binary case. For m ∈ M , we
set y1m =
p1(m)
p0(m)
y1. Because p0 is in the (relative) interior of ∆†(S ×M), one has
p0(m) > 0 for each m, and y1m ∈ (0, 1). Observe that y1 =
∑
m∈M p
0(m)y1m, and that
the following Bayesian updating property holds. If player 1’s belief is p0, and if player
2 plays two different actions b and b′ with respective probabilities y1m and 1 − y1m,
then following b the posterior belief of player 1 is equal to p1, and it is equal to p¯1
following b′.
Similarly, we let p¯0 ∈ (p1, p) be defined by hp1(p¯0) = 1−δδ c(p1, a0), and we set
y0m =
p0(m)
p1(m)
y0 for m ∈M , where y0 solves p1 = y0p0 + (1− y0)p¯0.
We next exchange the roles of the two players, and proceed in a slightly asymmetric
way. We let q¯1 ∈ (q0, q¯) be defined by hq0(q¯1) = 1− δ
δ
c(q0, b1), we let x0 be defined
by q0 = x0q1 + (1− x0)q¯1, and we set x0l =
p1(l)
p0(l)
x0 for l ∈ L.
We finally define q¯0 ∈ (q1, q), x1 ∈ (0, 1), and x1l =
q0(l)
q1(l)
x0 for l ∈ L in a similar
way.
We are now in a position to define strategies σ? and τ?. As long as players alternate
in playing their suboptimal action, player 1 (resp., player 2) randomizes in each odd
(resp., in each even) stage, and beliefs evolve cyclically:
p0, q0 → p0, q1 → p1, q1 → p1, q0 → p0, q0 → · · ·
Along this cycle, player 1 assigns a probability x1l to his suboptimal action, a
1, when
player 2’s belief is q0, and a probability x0l to his suboptimal action, a
0, when player
2’s belief is q1. Analog properties hold for player 2. This is summarized in Figure 6
below.
Stage player 1 player 2 belief Suboptimal action
1 mod 4 [x1l (a
1), (1− x1l )(a0)] b0 p0, q0 a1
2 mod 4 a0 [y1m(b
0), (1− y1m)(b1)] p0, q1 b0
3 mod 4 [x0l (a
0), (1− x0l )(a1)] b1 p1, q1 a0
0 mod 4 a1 [y0m(b
1), (1− y0m)(b0)] p1, q0 b1
Figure 6: the first phase of play: information exchange.
31
As soon as either player 1 plays his optimal action in some odd stage, or player 2
plays his optimal action in some even stage, the players switch to myopic play forever,
as described in columns 3 and 4 in Figure 7. Here and later, o(p) (resp. o(q)) stands
for an optimal action of player 1 at p (resp., of player 2 at q).
First stage in which
myopically optimal action is played new belief player 1 player 2
1 mod 4 p0, q¯1 a0 o(q¯1)
2 mod 4 p¯1, q1 o(p¯1) b1
3 mod 4 p1, q¯0 a1 o(q¯0)
0 mod 4 p¯0, q0 o(p¯0) b0
Figure 7: the second phase of play: myopic play.
We complete the definition of (σ?, τ?) by specifying actions and beliefs at infor-
mation sets that are ruled out by (σ?, τ?). For concreteness, we focus on player 1.
An information set of player 1 contains all histories of the form (l, h), for a fixed
signal l ∈ L, and a fixed sequence h ∈ H of moves. Fix an information set that is
reached with probability 0 under (σ?, τ?). We denote it by I
1
l,h, with h ∈ H. Write
h = (h′, (a¯, b¯)), so that h′ is the longest prefix of h, and assume that I1l,h′ is reached
with positive probability.
We distinguish two cases. Assume first that the action b¯ has probability zero
conditional on h′. This is the case where player 2 deviates in an observable way at h′.
We let the belief of player 1 at I1l,h be equal to the belief held at I
1
l,h′ – the deviation
by player 2 is interpreted as being non-informative about m. Assume now that b¯ is
played with positive probability at h′. In that case, the belief of player 1 at I1l,h can
be computed by Bayes’ rule, from the belief held at I1l,h′ .
In both cases, we let the belief at all subsequent information sets be equal to the
belief at I1l,h, and we let σ? repeat forever any action that is optimal at I
1
l,h.
Observe that, following any history in I1l,h, under τ? player 2 repeats forever the
same action.21 Indeed, either the sequence h of actions has probability 0, or it has
positive probability. In the former case, the claim follows from the definition of τ? at
zero probability information sets. In the latter case, this implies that the information
21To be precise, player 2 plays the same action at I1m,h and in all subsequent information sets.
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set I1l′,h has positive probability, for some l
′ 6= l. Since the support of player 1’s mixed
actions in the information phase does not depend on his signal, this implies that I1l,h
must belong to the myopic play phase. Using this observation, one can check that
beliefs are consistent with the strategy profile (σ?, τ?). We omit the proof.
Note that the strategy σ? is sequentially rational at any I
1
l,h that is reached with
probability 0. Indeed, since the belief of player 1 is the same at I1l,h and at all
subsequent information sets, it is a best reply to repeat any action that is optimal at
I1l,h.
Lemma 3 The profile (σ?, τ?) is a sequential equilibrium of Γ(p
0, q0), with payoff
(u?(p
0), v?(q
0) + 1−δ
δ
c(q0, b1)).
We will use this lemma for various distributions p0, q0. To avoid confusion, we
will then denote the profile (σp
0,q0
? , τ
p0,q0
? ).
Proof. Each of the strategies σ? and τ? can be described by an automaton with 8
states: four states that implement the periodic play in Figure 6, and four states that
implement the myopic play in Figure 7.
In addition, transitions between (automaton) states are deterministic and depend
only on the public history of moves. Hence, player i can always compute the current
state of player j’s automaton. Moreover, as can be verified inductively, the belief of
player i following any public history h of moves only depends on the current state of
player j’s automaton.
It follows that player i has a best response that can be implemented by an automa-
ton that has the same (or smaller) number of states as the automaton of player j. The
dynamic programming principle may be used to identify such a best response. Using
this principle, it is routine to verify that τ? is a best response against σ?, and vice versa.
Indeed, denoting the 8 states of the automata by Ω = {(1, periodic), (2, periodic),
(3, periodic), (0, periodic), (1, myopic), (2, myopic), (3, myopic), (0, myopic)}, the
expected payoff to player 2 starting at any given ω ∈ Ω is:
V (1, periodic) = v?(q
0) + 1−δ
δ
c(q0, b1); V (1, myopic) = v?(q
0);
V (2, periodic) = v?(q
1); V (2, myopic) = v?(q¯
1);
V (3, periodic) = v?(q
∗) + 1−δ
δ
c(q1, b0); V (3, myopic) = v?(q
1);
V (0, periodic) = v?(q
0); V (0, myopic) = v?(q¯
0).
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One may verify that for every ω ∈ Ω, V solves
V (ω) = max
b∈B
{
(1− δ)r(ω, b) + δ
∑
ω′∈Ω
V (ω, b)[ω′]
}
; (6)
here r(ω, b) stands for the expected payoff of player 2 when playing b in the (au-
tomaton) state ω, where the expectation is taken w.r.t. the belief held at state ω.
A.3 Proof of Lemma 2
Let a payoff vector γ ∈ [u?(p0), u?(p0) + ε]× [v?(q0), v?(q0) + ε] be given. For δ high
enough, we will define a sequential equilibrium profile in Γ(p0, q0) with payoff γ, using
the ideas in Section 2.1.2. We need some preparations.
Define γ1s and γ
1
o by the equations
γ1 = (1− δ)u?(p0) + δ(1− δ)u?(p0) + δ2γ1o ,
γ1 = (1− δ)u(p0, a1) + δ(1− δ)u?(p0) + δ2γ1s .
γ1s (resp. γ
1
o) are the continuation payoffs of player 1 at stage 2, which ensure that the
expected payoff of player 1 is γ1, if player 1 plays the myopically suboptimal (resp.
optimal) action at stage 1, and the myopically optimal action22 at stage 2.
Define γ2o be the equality
γ2 = (1− δ)v?(q0) + δγ2o .
Because γ1 > u?(p
0) > u(p0, a1) and γ2 > v?(q
0) it follows that γ1s > γ
1
o ≥ u?(p0)
while γ2o ≥ v?(q0). For δ high enough, and by definition of ε, one has
γ1s < u?(p
0) + maxhp0 and γ
2
o < v?(q
0) + maxhq0 .
Hence, there exist ps, po ∈ [p0, p¯), and qo ∈ [q0, q¯) such that
hp0(po) = γ
1
o − u?(p0),
hp0(ps) = γ
1
s − u?(p0),
hq0(qo) = γ
1
o − v?(q0).
Mimicking the previous section, we define
22The letters s, o remind that γ1o and γ
1
s are continuation payoffs following an optimal and a
suboptimal action respectively.
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• yo,m = p
1(m)
p0(m)
yo, for m ∈M , where yo solves p0 = yop1 + (1− yo)po.
• ys,m = p
1(m)
p0(m)
ys (m ∈M), where ys solves p0 = ysp1 + (1− ys)ps.
• xl = q
1(m)
q0(m)
x for l ∈ L, where x solves q0 = xq1 + (1− x)qo.
We are now in a position to define a profile as follows (see also Figure 8).
Stage 1: Player 2 plays b0, while player 1 plays the two actions a1 and a0 with
probabilities xl and 1 − xl. By Bayesian updating, following a1 the belief of
player 2 in stage 2 is equal to q1, and it is equal to qo following a
0 (while the
belief of player 1 is still p0).
Stage 2: Player 2 randomizes. Following a1, player 2 plays the two actions b0 and b1
with probabilities ys,m and 1− ys,m respectively. Following a0, he plays the two
actions b1 and o(qo) with probabilities yo,m and 1−yo,m respectively. Meanwhile,
player 1 plays a0. By Bayesian updating, the belief of player 1 is equal to (i) p1
following either (a0, b1) or (a1, b0), (ii) to ps following (a
0, o(qo)) and (iii) to po
following (a1, b1).
Stage 3 and on: If player 2 played his optimal action in stage 2, players repeat their
optimal action. The continuation payoff is then (u?(p
1), v?(q
1)) following (a1, b1)
and is (u?(p
1
s), v?(qo)) following (a
0, o(qo)). Assume now that player 2 played b
1
in stage 2, following a0. Beliefs are then (p1o, qc) and players switch to the equilib-
rium profile (σ
p1o,qo
? , τ
p1o,qo
? ) of Γ(p1o, qo), with payoff
(
u?(p
1
o), v?(qo) +
1−δ
δ
c(qo, b
1)
)
.
Finally, assume that player 2 played b0 in stage 2, following a1. Beliefs are then
(p1, q1), and players switch to the profile (σp
1,q1
? , τ
p1,q1
? ).
belief p0, q0, payoff γ
p0, q1
p0, qo
belief p1, q1, payoff u?(p
1), v?(q
1) + 1−δδ c(q
1, b0))
belief p1o, q
1, payoff u?(p
1
o), v?(q
1)
belief p1, qo, payoff u?(p
1), v?(qo) +
1−δ
δ c(qo, b
1))
belief p1s, qo, payoff u?(p
1
s), v?(qo)
a1
a0
b0
b1
b1
o(qc)
Figure 8: The evolution of beliefs and of continuation payoffs.
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Beliefs and actions at information sets that are ruled by this description are defined
as in the proof of Lemma 1. The equations defining γ1s , γ
1
o (resp. γ
2
o) ensure that player
1 is indifferent in stage 1 (resp. player 2 in stage 2) between the two actions that
are assigned positive probability. This implies the equilibrium property. Details are
standard and omitted.
A.4 Proofs of Propositions 1 and 2
We start with the proof of Proposition 1. The construction we provide here is more
complex than needed for Proposition 1. However, it will facilitate the proof of Propo-
sition 2. We let initial distributions p and q be given, in the interiors of ∆†(S ×M)
and ∆†(T ×L). Choose a segment [p0, p1] included in the interior of ∆†(S×M), such
that (i) u? is not affine on [p
0, p1], and (ii) p ∈ (p0, p1).
By (i) and (ii), one has u?(p) < yu?(p
0) + (1− y)u?(p1), where y solves yp0 + (1−
y)p1 = p. Observe also that the quantity y˜u?(p
0)+(1−y˜)u?(p˜1) (with y˜p0+(1−y˜)p˜1 =
p) is strictly decreasing in the neighborhood of p1, as p˜1 ∈ [p0, p1] moves away from
p1 and towards p0.
By Lemma 2, there exists ε0 > 0, δ¯ < 1, and neighborhoods V (p
i) and V (qj) of pi
and qj (i, j ∈ {0, 1}), such that any payoff in [u?(p˜i), u?(p˜i) + ε0]× [v?(q˜j), v?(q˜i) + ε0]
is a sequential equilibrium payoff of the game Γ(p˜i, q˜j), as soon as δ ≥ δ¯.
We now prove that the conclusion of Proposition 1 holds with ε = ε0. Let γ ∈
[u?(p), u?(p) + ε0] × [v?(q), v?(q) + ε0] be given. We describe an equilibrium profile
that implements γ.
One main feature of this profile is the following. As a result of information dis-
closure by player 2, player 1’s belief will move in one stage from p to a belief p˜i close
to either p0 or p1. Similarly, player 2’s belief will change to a belief q˜j close to either
q0 or q1 in exactly one stage. From that point on, players implement an equilibrium
of Γ(p˜i, q˜j) with the appropriate payoff. There is however one minor difference with
previously defined equilibria. If u?(p) < γ
1 < yu?(p
0) + (1 − y)u?(p1), then the ex-
pected payoff of player 1 if we follow the previous construction will be higher than
γ1, which is the target payoff. There are two ways to overcome this difficulty. One
way is to choose in this case p0 and p1 which are closer to p, thereby lowering the
expected continuation payoff yu?(p
0) + (1− y)u?(p1). A second way, which we adopt
here, is to delay information revelation, so that the discounted payoff is lower than
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yu?(p
0) + (1− y)u?(p1).
DefineN1 ≥ 1 to be the least integer23 such that γ1c ≥ yu?(p0)+(1−y)u?(p1), where
γ1c is defined by γ
1 = (1−δN1)u?(p)+δN1γ1c . The inequality γ1c ≥ yu?(p0)+(1−y)u?(p1)
ensures that if player 2 starts revealing information at stage N1, then one can support
γ1c as a continuation payoff of player 1 at that stage. Define N2 in a similar way for
player 2, and assume w.l.o.g. that N1 ≤ N2. Information is first disclosed at stage
N1. The choice of N1 implies
γ1c −
(
yu?(p
0) + (1− y)u?(p1)
) ≤ 1− δ
δ
(
yu?(p
0) + (1− y)u?(p1)− u?(p)
)
,
provided δ is high enough.
This implies that for δ high enough, there is p˜1 ∈ V (p1) ∩ [p0, p1] such that γ1c =
y˜u?(p
0) + (1− y˜)u?(p˜1), and y˜p0 + (1− y˜)p˜1 = p.
We first define a strategy pair (σ, τ) up to stage N1+1. Player 1 repeats an optimal
action o(p) at all stages 1, . . . , N1. Player 2 plays o(q) at all stages 1, . . . , N1 − 1. In
stage N1, player 2 plays both actions o(q) and b
′ 6= o(q) with probabilities such that
beliefs in stage N1 + 1 are (p
0, q) following b′, and (p˜1, q) following o(q).
We now define the continuation of (σ, τ) following o(q). Define γ2c by the equality
γ2 = (1 − δN1)v?(q) + δN1γ2c . The continuation of (σ, τ) in the other case is defined
in an analog way, except that γ2c has to be replaced by γ
2
c +
1− δ
δ
c(q, b′), and the
equations that describe equilibrium constraints have to be adjusted.
Let N˜2 be the least integer (possibly infinite) such that γ˜
2 ≥ xv?(q0)+(1−x)v?(q1),
where γ˜2 is defined by γ2c = (1− δN˜2)v?(q) + δN˜2 γ˜2. The choice of N˜2 implies
γ˜2 − (xv?(q0) + (1− x)v?(q1)) ≤ 1− δ
δ
(
xu?(q
0) + (1− x)u?(q1)− v?(q)
)
,
provided δ is high enough. This implies that for δ high enough, there is q˜1 ∈ V (q1)∩
[q0, q1] such that γ˜2 = x˜v?(q
0) + (1− x˜)v?(q˜1), and x˜q0 + (1− x˜)q˜1 = q.
The continuation profile is defined as follows. Player 2 repeats o(q) in all stages
N1 + 1, . . . , N1 + N˜2. Player 1 repeats o(p˜
1) in all stages N1, . . . , N1 + . . . N˜2 − 1. In
stage N1 + N˜2, player 1 plays both actions o(p˜
1) and a 6= o(p˜1) with probabilities such
that the belief of player 2 is equal to q˜1 following o(p˜1), and to q0 following a.
23N1 =∞ if γ1 = u?(p).
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Following o(p˜1), players switch to an equilibrium of the game Γ(p˜1, q˜1) with payoff
(u?(p˜
1), v?(q˜
1)). Following a, players switch to an equilibrium of the game Γ(p˜1, q0)
with payoff (u?(p˜
1) + 1−δ
δ
c(p˜1, a), v?(q
0)).
Beliefs and actions off-the-equilibrium-path are defined as in the proof of Lemma
1. The definition of beliefs and continuation payoffs ensure that players are indifferent
whenever randomizing, and that the overall payoff is exactly γ.
Observe also that there exists a neighborhood V (p) of p, with the following prop-
erty. The two beliefs p′0 and p′1 associated with p′ ∈ V (p) can be chosen to be contin-
uous in p′ and x′u?(p
′0)+(1−x′)u?(p′1) (with x′p′0 +(1−x′)p′1 = p′) is bounded away
from u?(p
′) over V (p). Together with the symmetric property for player 2, this en-
sures that the robustness result mentioned after Proposition 1 holds. This concludes
the proof of Proposition 1.
We next proceed to the proof of Proposition 2. Let p ∈
◦
∆
†
(S×M), q ∈
◦
∆
†
(T×L),
and c > 0 be given. Let γ be such that |γ1−u?(p)| ≤ (1−δ)c and |γ2−v?(q)| ≤ (1−δ)c.
Let [p0, p1] be the segment associated with p in the proof of Proposition 1, and let y
solve the equation p = yp0 + (1− y)p1. Set
η :=
(
yu?(p
0) + (1− y)u?(p1)
)− u?(p) > 0,
and let N1 be defined as in the proof of Proposition 1. By construction, one has
(1− δN1−1)u?(p) + δN1−1(u?(p) + η) < γ1 ≤ u?(p) + (1− δ)c,
hence ηδN1−1 ≤ (1 − δ)c. Similarly, one has ηδN2−1 ≤ (1 − δ)c (for a possibly lower
value of η). In the construction of Proposition 1, players repeat the same action until
stage min{N1, N2}. Therefore, for any p′ ∈ ∆†(S×M) and every strategy σ, one has
γ1(p′, q, σ, τp,q,γ) ≤ (1− δmin{N1,N2})u?(p′) + δmin{N1,N2}
≤ u?(p′) + (1− δ)δc
η
.
The result follows, with C = c/η.
B General games
We here complete the proof of the Main Theorem. We start with a few notations and
remarks in the spirit of Section A. We let initial distributions p ∈ ∆(S × LS ×MS)
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and q ∈ ∆(T × LT ×MT ) be given. W.l.o.g., we also assume that p(lS) > 0 and
p(lT ) > 0 for each lS ∈ LS and lT ∈ LT .24 We assume that the information of each
player i is valuable for the other player. This is equivalent to assuming that, for each
lS ∈ LS, there is no action a ∈ A that is optimal at all beliefs plS ,mS := p(·|lS,mS),
mS ∈MS.
As the play proceeds, player 2 may disclose information relative to mS, and player
1’s belief about mS may change. Analogously to the case of self-ignorant games (see
Eq. (5)), the belief pn of player 1 given lS = ls is always in the set
∆†lS(S ×MS) = conv{plS ,mS ⊗ 1lS ⊗ 1mS ,mS ∈MS}.
Note that p(·|lS) lies in the relative interior of the set ∆†(S ×MS).
For mT ∈MT , we define ∆†mT (T ×LT ) in a symmetric way. The results of Section
A will be applied to the different sets ∆†lS(S × MS) and ∆†mT (T × LT ) of initial
distributions.
B.1 Providing Incentives
For simplicity, we focus here on player 1. Analog properties hold for player 2 as well.
We first define an equivalence relation ∼ over LS. As we will see, two signals lS and
l¯S such that lS ∼ l¯S may be merged, and treated as a single signal. Given lS ∈ LS,
we define a vector ~Z lS of size MS × A× A by
~Z lSmS ,a,a′ := p(mS|lS) (u(plS ,mS , a)− u(plS ,mS , a′)) , for mS ∈MS, and a, a′ ∈ A.
Because the information held by player 2 is valuable for player 1, ~Z lS 6= ~0, for each
lS ∈ LS.25
Definition 2 Let lS, l¯S ∈ LS be given. The two signals lS and l¯S are equivalent,
written lS ∼ l¯S, if the two vectors ~Z lS and ~Z l¯S are positively collinear, that is, if
∃α > 0, ~Z l¯S = α~Z lS . (7)
Plainly, if the two distributions p(·|lS) and p(·|l¯S) in ∆(S×MS) coincide, then lS ∼ l¯S.
However, the converse implication does not hold.
24And we make the symmetric assumption for player 2.
25Indeed, if ~ZlS = ~0, then any action a ∈ A is optimal at plS ,mS , for each mS .
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Observe that, if lS ∼ l¯S and ~Z l¯S = α~Z lS , then for every two mixed actions
x, x′ ∈ ∆(A) we have:
p(mS|l¯S)
(
u(pl¯S ,mS , x)− u
(
pl¯S ,mS , x
′)) = αp(mS|lS) (u(plS ,mS , x)− u (plS ,mS , x′)) .
(8)
As a preparation for Lemma 4 below, observe that a strategy σ may be viewed
as a collection (σlS)lS∈LS , with the interpretation that σlS : LT × H → ∆(A) is the
‘interim’ strategy used if lS = lS.
26
Lemma 4 Let τ be any strategy of player 2. Then there exists a best reply σ of player
1 to τ such that σl¯S = σlS whenever l¯S ∼ lS.
According to Lemma 4, player 1 has a best reply that depends only on the equiv-
alence class of lS.
Proof. Let a strategy τ of player 2 be fixed throughout. Given f : H → ∆(A),
and (lS, lT ) ∈ LS × LT , we denote by γ1(f, τ |lS, lT ) the interim expected payoff of
player 1, when getting lS = lS, lT = lT , and when playing according to f thereafter.
Given n ≥ 1, we also denote by g1n(f, τ |lS, lT ) the corresponding payoff at stage n.
We let l¯S ∼ lS be any two equivalent signals, so that ~Z l¯S = α~Z lS for some
α > 0. We will prove that, for every two “interim strategies” f : H → ∆(A) and
f ′ : H → ∆(A), for every lT ∈ LT and every stage n ≥ 1, one has
g1n(f, τ |l¯S, lT )− g1n(f ′, τ |l¯S, lT ) = α
(
g1n(f, τ |lS, lT )− g1n(f ′, τ |lS, lT )
)
. (9)
Equation (9) will imply that
γ1(f, τ |l¯S, lT )− γ1(f ′, τ |l¯S, lT ) = α
(
γ1(f, τ |lS, lT )− γ1(f ′, τ |lS, lT )
)
,
from which the result follows. Indeed, if f is better than f ′ when the signal is l¯S,
then it is also the case when the signal is lS. Therefore if f is a best response when
the signal is l¯S, then it is also a best response when the signal is lS.
We let a stage n ≥ 1 be given. We fix (lS, lT ) ∈ LS × LT , and we decompose the
payoff g1n(f, τ |lS, lT ) as follows. For a given sequence of moves h ∈ Hn := (A×B)n−1,
we denote by Pf,τ (h|lS, lT ) the probability that h occurs, when (lS, lT ) = (lS, lT ) and
26To be formal, σlS (lT , h) is defined to be σ(lS , lT , h).
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players play according to f and τ . We denote by Pf,τ (·|h, lS, lT ) ∈ ∆(S ×MS) the
belief which is then held by player 1.
With these notations, one has
g1n(f, τ |lS, lT ) =
∑
h∈Hn
Pf,τ (h|lS, lT )u (Pf,τ (·|h, lS, lT )), f(h)) . (10)
The belief of player 1 following h is given by
Pf,τ (s|h, lS, lT ) = 1
Pf,τ (h, lS, lT )
∑
mS∈MS
Pf,τ (s, h, lS, lT ,mS), s ∈ S,
where Pf,τ (h, lS, lT ) = Pf,τ (h|lS, lT )p(lS)q(lT ). Because the state s and the history
of moves until stage n are conditionally independent given (lS, lT ,mS), this belief is
equal to
Pf,τ (s|h, lS, lT ) = 1
Pf,τ (h, lS, lT )
∑
mS∈MS
Pf,τ (h|lS, lT ,mS)plS ,mS(s)p(lS,mS)q(lT ).
(11)
Plugging (11) into (10), and using the linearity of u, one gets
g1n(f, τ |lS, lT ) =
∑
h∈Hn
∑
mS∈MS
p(mS|lS)Pf,τ (h|lS, lT ,mS)u(plS ,mS , f(h)). (12)
Using (12) for both f and f ′, and because
∑
h∈Hn Pσ,τ (h | lS, lT ,mS) =
∑
h′∈Hn Pσ′,τ (h
′ |
lS, lT ,mS) = 1, we obtain:
g1n(f, τ |lS , lT )− g1n(f ′, τ |lS , lT ) (13)
=
∑
mS∈MS
p(mS |lS)
∑
h∈Hn
Pf,τ (h|lS , lT ,mS)u(plS ,mS , f(h))−
∑
h′∈Hn
Pf ′,τ (h
′|lS , lT ,mS)u(plS ,mS , f ′(h′))

=
∑
mS∈MS
∑
h∈Hn
∑
h′∈Hn
Pf,τ (h|lS , lT ,mS)Pf ′,τ (h′|lS , lT ,mS)× p(mS |lS)
(
u(plS ,mS , f(h))− u(plS ,mS , f ′(h′))
)
.
Because lS and l¯S are equivalent, Eq. (9) follows by (8), and (13) applied to both
lS = lS and lS = l¯S.
Lemma 4 implies that any equilibrium of the modified game in which player 1
only observes the equivalence class of lS is an equilibrium of the original game. Put
it differently, the set of equilibrium payoffs of the game in which players do not
distinguish between equivalent signals is a subset of the set of equilibrium payoffs of
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the game we started with. Besides, the values of u? and v? (resp., of u?? and v??) are
the same for both games.
Therefore, it is sufficient to prove that the conclusion of the Main Theorem holds
for the modified game. In particular, we may and will assume from here on that,
for every two signals l¯S 6= lS, the vectors ~Z l¯S and ~Z lS are not positively collinear.
We also make the symmetric assumption for player 2. A direct consequence of this
assumption is Corollary 1 below.
Corollary 1 Let a¯ ∈ A be arbitrary. For lS ∈ LS, define the vector ~Y lS of size
MS × A by
~Y lSmS ,a := p(mS|lS) (u(plS ,mS , a)− u(plS ,mS , a¯)) , mS ∈MS, a ∈ A.
Then for every two signals l¯S 6= lS, the two vectors ~Y l¯S and ~Y lS are not positively
collinear.
The vector ~Y lS is equal to the projection of ~Z lS on a lower-dimensional space.
Hence, linear independence of ~Y l¯S and of ~Y lS does not follow in general from linear
independence of ~Z l¯S and ~Z lS , and an ad hoc proof is needed.
Proof. We argue by contradiction, and assume that ~Y l¯S = α~Y lS for some α > 0.
Let mS ∈ MS, a, a′ ∈ A be arbitrary. Observe that ~Z lSmS ,a,a′ = ~Y lSmS ,a − ~Y lSmS ,a′ , for
lS = l¯S, lS. Hence ~Z
l¯S = α~Z lS , a contradiction.
The next lemma is central to the provision of incentives (phase 2 of the equilibrium
play). Given x : LS ×MS → ∆(A), and for every lS, k ∈ LS, we define
Ex[lS → k] =
∑
mS∈MS
p(mS|lS)u(plS ,mS , xk,mS),
with the following interpretation. The expression Ex[lS → k] is the expected stage
payoff when player 1 gets lS = lS ∈ LS, ‘reports’ k ∈ LS, is told mS, and plays
the mixed action xk,mS that depends on player 1’s report, and on player 2’s signal.
27
According to Lemma 5 below, the map x can be chosen in a way that this expected
payoff is highest when reporting truthfully.
27We use the different letter k to distinguish between a signal and a report, although both belong
to the same set LS .
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Lemma 5 There exists x? : LS ×MS → ∆(A), such that
Ex? [lS → k] < Ex? [lS → lS], for every lS, k ∈ LS, lS 6= k.
Proof. Let a¯ ∈ A be arbitrary, and let x : LS × MS → ∆(A) be given. For
k ∈ LS, we define a vector ~Xk of size MS×A by ~XkmS ,a := xk,mS(a), mS ∈MS, a ∈ A.
Observe that xk,mS(a¯) = 1−
∑
a6=a¯
xk,mS(a). Hence, Ex[lS → k] may be rewritten as
Ex[lS → k] =
∑
mS∈MS
p(mS|lS)u(plS ,mS , a¯)
+
∑
mS∈MS
∑
a∈A
p(mS|lS)xk,mS(a) (u (plS ,mS , a)− u (plS ,mS , a¯))
= ~Y lS · ~Xk +
∑
mS∈MS
p(mS|lS)u(plS ,mS , a¯).
Because the second term in the last displayed equation does not depend on k, it is
sufficient to construct x such that
~Y lS · ~Xk < ~Y lS · ~X lS for every lS, k ∈ LS, lS 6= k. (14)
For lS ∈ LS, define
X˜ lS :=
1
‖~Y lS‖2
~Y lS ,
and let lS 6= k be arbitrary in LS. Then by the Cauchy-Schwartz inequality,
X˜k · ~Y lS =
~Y k
‖~Y k‖2
· ~Y lS < ‖~Y lS‖2 =
~Y lS
‖~Y lS‖2
· ~Y lS = X˜ lS · ~Y lS ,
where the strict inequality holds since ~Y k and ~Y lS are not positively collinear. There-
fore, (14) holds with (X˜ lS)lS∈LS . Note that (14) still holds when the same constant
is added to all components, and/or when all components are multiplied by the same
constant φ > 0. Choose β ∈ R and φ > 0 such that all components of φX˜ lS + β lie
in (0, 1|MS×A|), for all lS. Because Y
lS
mS ,a¯ = 0, it suffices to set
x?lS ,mS(a) = φX˜
lS
mS ,a
+ β for a 6= a¯,
and x?lS ,mS(a¯) = 1−
∑
a6=a¯
xlS ,mS(a).
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Given ε2 : MS → ∆(MS), and lS, k ∈ LS, we define
Eε2,x? [lS → k] =
∑
mS ,µ∈MS
p(mS|lS)ε2(µ|mS)u(plS ,µ, x?k,µ).
This is the expected stage payoff of player 1 when (i) player 1 gets lS = lS, and
‘reports’ k, (ii) player 2 draws µ ∈ MS according to ε2(·|mS) and (iii) player 1 plays
x?k,µ. We here abuse notation and write plS ,µ for the belief of player 1, given lS and
µ.28
Observe that the expectation Eε2,x? [lS → k] is continuous w.r.t. ε2, and that
Eε2,x? [lS → k] is equal to Ex? [lS → k] when ε2(·|mS) assigns probability 1 to mS, for
each mS. Corollary 2 below therefore follows from Lemma 5 by continuity.
Corollary 2 There exists ε2 : MS →
◦
∆(MS), such that
Eε2,x? [lS → k] < Eε2,x? [lS → lS], for every lS, k ∈ LS, lS 6= k. (15)
We fix ε2 and x
? for the rest of the paper. Because the distribution ε2(·|mS) has full
support, the conditional distribution plS ,µ lies in the relative interior of ∆
†
lS
(S ×MS)
(for each µ ∈MS). Define ε1 analogously.
B.2 Equilibrium strategies – Structure
We let a payoff vector γ = (γ1, γ2) be given, with u? < γ
1 < u?? and v? < γ
2 < v??.
We will construct a sequential equilibrium with payoff γ. We let the discount factor
δ be given. In the construction we add one additional message, , to each player.
Given x ∈ ∆(A), and given a number N of stages, we denote by ~aN(x) ∈ AN , a
sequence of actions of length N that provides the best approximation of the mixed
action x in terms of discounted frequencies. That is, ~aN(x) = (an)1≤n≤N is chosen to
minimize ‖xδ(~aN)− x‖∞, where
xδ(~a
N)[a] :=
1− δ
1− δN
N∑
n=1
δn−11{an=a}, a ∈ A.
The sequence ~aN(x?k,µ1) will be the sequence of actions required from player 1
in phase 2.2, when player 1 reports k ∈ LS and player 2 sends the message µ1 ∈
28Note that, for fixed µ, the belief plS ,µ depends on ε2, although this is not emphasized in the
notation.
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MS ∪ {}. For µ1 = , we let ~aN(x?k,µ1) be an arbitrary sequence of actions, that
does not depend on k ∈ LS.
Similarly, ~bN(y) ∈ BN is a vector that approximates the mixed action y in terms
of discounted frequencies.
We set K1 := max{|LS|, |MT |}, and we let α1 : LS → AK1 and β1 : MT → BK1
be arbitrary one-to-one maps. Similarly, we set K2 := 1 + max{|LT |, |MS|}, and we
let α2 : LT ∪ {} → AK2 and β2 : MS ∪ {} → BK2 be arbitrary one-to-one maps.
The maps α1 and β1 are used to encode reports on one’s own state into sequences of
actions, while the maps α2 and β2 are used to encode messages on the other player’s
state into sequences of actions.
We let pi1 ∈
◦
∆(LT ) and pi
2 ∈
◦
∆(MS) be arbitrary distributions with full support.
We now proceed to the definition of a strategy profile (σδ, τδ). The definition
involves additional parameters θ, ζ, and ψi, ψi (i = 1, 2), all in (0, 1), which will be
chosen later. We first define the profile only at information sets that are not ruled
out by the definition of (σδ, τδ) at earlier information sets. The definition of (σδ, τδ)
at information sets that are reached with probability zero will be provided after.
Phase 1 It lasts K1 stages. Player 1 plays the sequence α1(lS) of actions, and player
2 plays the sequence β1(mT ) of actions.
Phase 2 It is divided into two subphases, Phase 2.1 and Phase 2.2.
Phase 2.1 It lasts K2 stages. Player 1 first draws a message λ1 ∈ LT ∪ {}.
The probability assigned to , (resp. to each l′T ∈ LT ), is equal to 1 − ζ
(resp. ζ × ε1(l′T |lT )). Symmetrically, player 2 draws a message µ1 ∈MS ∪
{}. The probability assigned to , (resp. to each m′S ∈ MS) is equal to
1− ζ, (resp. ζ × ε2(m′S|mS)).
In that phase, the players play the sequences α2(λ1) and β2(µ1) of actions.
Phase 2.2 It lasts ν := b ln(1−θ)
ln δ
c stages. Player 1 infers µ1 from the actions
played by player 2 in Phase 2.1, and plays the sequence ~aν(x?lS ,µ1) of actions.
Meanwhile, player 2 infers λ1 from the actions played by player 1 in Phase
2.1, and plays the sequence ~b(y?mT ,λ1) of actions.
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Phase 3 It lasts K2 stages. Player 1 draws a message λ2 ∈ LT . The distribution
of λ2 depends on λ1. If λ1 = , the probability assigned to lT (resp. to each
l′T 6= lT ), is equal (1 − ψ1) + ψ1 × pi1(lT ) (resp. ψ1 × pi1(l′T )). If λ1 6= , the
probability assigned to λ2 is equal to (1 − ψ1) + ψ1 × pi1(λ2) if λ2 = lT , and
it is equal ψ1 × pi1(λ2) otherwise. Player 2 draws a message µ2 ∈ MS. The
distribution of µ2 depends on µ1, and is obtained as for player 1.
In this phase, the players play the sequences α2(λ2) and β2(µ2) of actions.
Phase 4 It contains all remaining stages. We denote by N = K1 + 2K2 + ν + 1 its
first stage. Let h = (an(h), bn(h))n<N ∈ (A × B)N−1 be the history of moves
up to stage N . Player 2 infers from h the belief pn(h) held by player 1 in each
stage n < N along h. In this computation, the report of player 1 in Phase 1
is assumed to be truthful. For n < N , the belief qn(h) ∈ ∆(T × LT ) is defined
in a symmetric way. The players compute
c1(h) = δ
−N∑
n
(1−δ)δn−1c(pn(h), an(h)) and c2(h) = δ−N
∑
n
(1−δ)δn−1c(qn(h), bn(h)),
where the sum is taken over all stages n of Phases 1, 2.1 and 3. Players then
start playing according to the equilibrium profile of the semi-ignorant game
Γ(pn(h), qn(h)), with payoff (u?(pn(h)) + c1(h), v?(qn(h)) + c2(h)).
Some interpretation may be helpful. In Phase 2.1, the message  is uninforma-
tive,29 and is sent with high probability. In Phase 3, the level noise in the message
sent by player 1 depend on player 1’s first message, and is either ψ1 if the first message
was informative, or ψ1 otherwise.
B.3 Equilibrium Strategies – Parameter values
We now fix the parameter values, starting with θ. As δ → 1, the discounted weight
of the b ln(1−θ)
ln δ
c stages of Phase 2.2 converges to θ. Thus, θ is a measure of the
contribution of the checking phase 2.2 to the total payoff. We choose θ ∈ (0, 1) to be
small enough so that the following set of inequalities is satisfied:
(1− θ)E[u?(plS ,mS)|lS = lS, µ1 = mS] > u?(p(·|lS = lS, µ1 = mS)), ∀mS ∈MS(16)
(1− θ)u?? > γ1, (17)
29Since its probability does not depend on signals.
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together with the symmetric conditions for player 2.
By construction, the conditional distribution of mS given (lS, µ1) = (lS,mS) is
independent of ζ, and only depends on the fixed map ε2. Since ε2(·|m′S) has full
support for each m′S, this conditional distribution has full support. Therefore, the
residual information held by player 2 is still valuable to player 1, whatever be µ1 ∈
{}∪MS. In particular, (16) holds with θ = 0, and thus also for θ > 0 small enough.
Because γ1 < u??, condition (17) is also satisfied for small θ.
Condition (16) ensures that, even if payoffs in phase 2.2 are very low, the weight
θ of phase 2.2 is so small, that the residual value of the information held by player 2
can still offset the cost incurred when playing the prescribed sequence in phase 2.2.
Condition (16) is designed to make sure that, when in phase 2.2, player 1 will rather
play the prescribed sequence of actions, than switch to an optimal action.
Observe that with probability 1−ζ, player 1 receives no information prior to phase
3. Hence, for ζ > 0 small, the bulk of information exchange takes place in phase 3.
Condition (17) ensures that, even if all information exchange is postponed to phase
3, payoffs as high as γ1 can be implemented.
Choose ζ ∈ (0, 1) to be small enough so that the two inequalities
(1− ζ)u? + ζu?? < γ1 < (1− ζ)(1− θ)u?? (18)
hold, together with the analog inequalities for player 2.
In phase 2.2, the (conditional) optimal payoff of player 1 is u? if µ1 = , and does
not exceed u?? if µ1 6= . The first inequality ensures that the probability 1 − ζ of
not disclosing information in phase 2.1 (µ1 = ) is so high that the expectation of
the optimal payoff given µ1 does not exceed γ
1. That is, additional information must
be disclosed in phase 3 in order to implement γ. This inequality, together with (17),
will allow us to adjust other parameter values in a way that the overall payoff is γ.
The second inequality in (18) does not play a critical role.
We now choose the value of ψ2 ∈ (0, 1) small enough so that, for every lS ∈
LS,mS ∈MS,
(1− θ)E[u?(p(·|lS, µ1, µ2))|lS = lS, µ1 = mS] > u?(p(·|lS = lS, µ1 = mS)). (19)
In this expression, p(·|lS, µ1, µ2)) is the belief held by player 1 at the beginning of
phase 4, after having received the two messages µ1, µ2 of player 2. The left-hand side
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of (19) is continuous w.r.t. ψ2. For ψ2 = 0, µ2 is equal to mS with probability 1, and
(19) therefore holds by (16). Hence (19) holds for ψ2 > 0 small enough.
Observe that all parameters values ζ, θ, ψ2 are independent of the discount factor.
The last parameter, ψ2 is chosen such that the expected payoff of player 1 is γ
1. We
first argue that for a given ψ2, the limit discounted payoff of player 1, as δ → 1, is
equal to30
θE[u(p(·|lS, µ1), x?lS ,µ1)] + (1− θ)E[u?(pN)]. (20)
Here is why. The contribution of Phases 1, 2.1 and 3 vanishes, as the length of
these phases is fixed independently of δ. The expected payoff in phase 2.2 converges31
to E[u(p(·|lS, µ1), x?lS ,µ1)]. Finally, for a fixed δ, the expected continuation payoff from
stageN is equal to E[u?(pN)+c1(hN)]. As Lemma 6 will show, E[c1(hN)] will converge
to 0.
Observe that for ψ2 = 0, and following µ1 = , the message µ2 of player 2 is non-
informative. Thus, conditional on the event that µ1 = , player 2 does not disclose
information prior to phase 4. Thus, for ψ2 = 0, the left-hand side of (20) does not
exceed (1 − ζ)u? + ζu?? which by (18) is less than γ1. If ψ2 = 1, following µ1 = 
the message µ2 is fully informative, and the left-hand side of (20) is at least equal to
ζu? + (1− ζ) (θu? + (1− θ)u??), which exceeds γ1 by (18). It follows that for δ high
enough, say δ ≥ δ¯1, there exists ψ2(δ) ∈ (0, 1), such that the discounted payoff of
player 1 is equal to γ1, and such that ψ2(1) := limδ→1 ψ
2
(δ) ∈ (0, 1).
We conclude this section by discussing how high should δ be, for the profile (σδ, τδ)
to be well-defined, and by discussing beliefs and actions off-equilibrium.
We first argue that the costs c1(h) and c2(h) are small.
Lemma 6 There is c > 0 such that for every δ ≥ δ¯1 and every h ∈ HN , one has
c1(h) ≤ (1− δ)c.
Proof. Because payoffs are bounded by 1, one has
c1(h) ≤ (K1 + 2K2)(1− δ)δ−N = (K1 + 2K2) (1− δ)
δK1+2K2
δ−b
ln(1−θ)
ln δ c
≤ (K1 + 2K2) (1− δ)
δK1+2K2+1
δ
ln(1−θ)
ln δ = (K1 + 2K2)
(1− δ)
δK1+2K2+1
1
ln(1− θ) ,
30We here abuse notation, since N → +∞ as δ → 1. However, the limit of E[u?(pN )] is well-
defined.
31Because the approximation of x? by xδ(~a(x
?)) becomes perfectly accurate as δ → 1.
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and the result follows.
For δ ≤ 1 (including δ = 1), denote by P(δ) the support of pN when ψ2 is set to
ψ2(δ), and define Q(δ) in a symmetric way. Since pi2 and ε2(·|mS) have full support,
and since ψ2, ψ2(1) ∈ (0, 1), one has pN ∈
◦
∆
†
lS
(S ×MS), with probability 1.
Because P(1) and Q(1) are finite sets, and by Proposition 1, there is δ¯2 < 1,
ε > 0, and neighborhoods V (p) of p ∈ P , V (q) of q ∈ Q, such that any payoff in
[u?(p
′), u?(p′) + ε]× [v?(q′), v?(q′) + ε] is a sequential equilibrium of Γ(p′, q′), for every
p ∈ P , p′ ∈ V (p), and q ∈ Q, q′ ∈ V (q).
In addition, we choose the neighborhoods V (p), V (q) to be small enough, and
C > 0 so that the conclusion of Proposition 2 holds for every p ∈ P , p′ ∈ V (p), and
q ∈ Q, q′ ∈ V (q).
We choose δ¯3 < 1 to be high enough so that the following conditions are met for
each δ ≥ δ¯3: (i) every p′ ∈ P(δ) belongs to V (p) for some p ∈ P ; (ii) (1− δ)c ≤ ε.
For δ ≥ δ¯3, the profile (σδ, τδ) is then well-defined, at any information set that is
not ruled out by the definition of (σδ, τδ) at earlier stages.
Consider now an information set I1l,h that is reached with probability 0, and assume
that the information set I1l,h′ is reached with positive probability, where h
′ is the
longest prefix of h.
If the sequence h of actions has probability zero, then we let beliefs at I1l,h and at
all subsequent information sets coincide with the belief held at I1l,h′ . Player 1 repeats
the action that is optimal at I1l,h′ .
Assume now that the sequence h has positive probability. This corresponds to
the case where player 1 misreported in Phase 1, and played consistently with his
report afterwards. Then the belief of player 1 at I1l,h is well-defined by Bayes’ rule
(and is independent of player 1’s strategy), and only assigns a positive probability to
information sets I2m,h that are reached with positive probability under τ?. We let σ?
play at I1l,h a best reply to τ?.
By construction, sequential rationality holds at any information set I1l,h that is
reached with probability zero. One can verify that beliefs are consistent with (σ?, τ?).
We omit the proof.
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B.4 Equilibrium properties
We claim that the profile (σδ, τδ) is a sequential equilibrium profile for δ < 1 high
enough.
Let η > 0 be small enough so that
Eε2,x? [lS → k] < Eε2,x? [lS → lS]− 2η for every lS, k ∈ LS, lS 6= k,
and we choose δ¯4 < 1 such that
Eε2,xδ(~a(x?))[lS → k] < Eε2,xδ(~a(x?))[lS → lS]− η for every lS, k ∈ LS, lS 6= k and δ ≥ δ¯4.
We finally choose δ5 < 1 to be such that 1− δK1+2K2 + (1− δ)C < ηδK1+2K2 for each
δ ≥ δ¯5.
We now verify that (σ?, τ?) is a sequential equilibrium, as soon as δ ≥ max{δ¯4, δ¯5}.
It is sufficient to check that sequential rationality holds at any information set that
is reached with positive probability. Let such an information set Il,h be given, and let
n be the stage to which Il,h belongs. If stage n belongs to phase 4, then sequential
rationality at Il,h follows because continuation strategies in phase 4 form a sequential
equilibrium of the associated self-ignorant game. Assume then that n < N .
We will make use of the following observation that holds because ε1(·), ε2(·), pi1
and pi2 have full support: if IlS ,lT ,h is reached with positive probability, then the set
of actions that are played with positive probability at IlS ,lT ,h does not depend on lT ,
and, therefore, the information set IlS ,l′T ,h is also reached with positive probability, for
every l′S ∈ LS. We note that the compensation made in phase 4 implies that player 1
is indifferent at IlS ,lT ,h between all actions that are played with positive probability.
One thus simply needs to check that player 1 cannot increase his continuation payoff
by playing some other action, a.
Assume first that n belongs to either phase 2.1, 2.2 or to phase 3. In that case,
the set of actions that are played at Il,h does not depend on l. Hence, when playing
a, player 1 triggers a myopic play by player 2, and player 1’s overall payoff in that
case does not exceed
(1− δ)u?(pn) + δE[u?(pn+1)|l, h].
On the other hand, the expected continuation payoff of player 1 at Il,h is at least
δNE[u?(pN)|l, h]. Sequential rationality then follow from the choice of parameters.
50
Assume finally that stage n belongs to phase 1. Again, it is not profitable to switch
to an action that triggers a myopic play from player 2. What if player 1, instead of
reporting lS, chooses to report k 6= lS ? Then, as above, the choice of parameters
ensures that it is optimal for player 1 to play consistently with k, at least until phase
4. Such a deviation yields a payoff (discounted back to h) of at most
δ−n
(
δK1+K2Eε2,xδ(~a(x?))[lS → k] + (1− δ)
(
1 + · · ·+ δK1+2K2−1)+ δNE[u?(pN) + (1− δ)C]) .
On the other hand, player 1’s continuation payoff when reporting truthfully is at least
δ−n
(
δK1+K2Eε2,xδ(~a(x?))[lS → lS] + δNE[u?(pN) + (1− δ)C]
)
.
We stress that the distribution of pN is the same in both expressions, because the
distribution of (µ1, µ2) does not depend on player 1’s report. The result follows, by
the choice of δ¯4 and δ¯5.
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